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Prologue
The chronic inequality that characterized Latin America 
and the Caribbean has its roots not only in the region’s 
history but also in a pattern of development and mod-
ernization that perpetuated the socio-economic gaps. 
Very recently, however, the region experienced a period of 
sustained growth between 2003 and 2008, in which the 
indicators of poverty, indigence and even concentration of 
income improved, breaking, although for a short period, 
the so-called “empty box” of Fernando Fajnzylber.
It is well known that the state can promote greater social 
equity through more effective public policies. However, as 
noted in this work, some distinctive features of inequal-
ity in our region as the large fraction of total income 
captured by the highest stratum, the level of geographical 
disparities and the high levels of poverty, reflect the diffi-
culty in improving equity and cohesion and the complex-
ity of achieving that aim by means of decentralized poli-
cies. Most of the times, the poorest areas are exactly those 
that have the lowest tax bases for funding the priorities of 
local public spending.
To improve distributive impacts and promote equality 
and social cohesion in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
it is important to realize that citizens’ social needs are 
impossible to meet without financial resources. On the 
revenue size, the region’s fiscal systems share two impor-
tant limitations: low tax pressure and regressive taxation, 
which, together with large-scale evasion and tax avoid-
ance, all have major effects on equity. On the expendi-
ture size, it is hoped that the structure of the spending 
financed with the resources available can help to con-
struct more cohesive societies, increasing the legitimacy of 
public policy and therefore of paying the taxes intended 
to finance them. Decentralization is an important issue 
that affects the role of the state in improving the distribu-
tive equity, and the expected benefits of decentralization 
need to be evaluated in the context of the peculiarities of 
each country. 
 
In order to analyze in detail some aspects of the impact 
of public policies on equality as discussed in the ECLAC 
document “Time for equality: closing gaps, opening 
trails”, the Economic Development Division together 
with GIZ organized a seminar in which the main find-
ings of the thematic chapter of the Economic Survey 2010 
were discussed.
The purpose of this activity and this publication is to 
contribute to the discussion on the impact that public 
policy can have in strengthening the link between eco-
nomic growth and distributive equality, a link which has 
been quite elusive in the region’s economic history. The 
document address important issues as the consequences 
for income distribution of macroeconomic volatility; the 
way in which the latter affects the labour market, and the 
policy options dealing with it; the analysis of the distribu-
tive impacts of tax policy and the characteristics and 
possible impacts of social spending. The conclusion states 
that public policies must secure the financing needed to 
improve citizen access to social provisions in a way that 
combines efficiency with solidarity, relevance and univer-
sality, all at the most appropriate level of government.
Inequality remains one of the biggest economic and social 
challenges in the region and public policy reforms needed 
to close the social gap require a constant effort to learn 
and rethink the kinds of intervention needed to overcome 
poverty and inequality and to increase people’s sense of 
belonging to a growing economy. 
Osvaldo Kacef
Director
Economic Development Divison, ECLAC
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Preface
‘The distributive impact of public policy’ is a key factor 
that affects the outcome of all development measures. The 
present study is therefore of utmost importance for Ger-
man development policy. In terms of income distribution, 
Latin America as a region still displays the highest degree 
of inequality in the world. Consequently, the question 
of how to shape and implement public policies such that 
they have a redistributive impact and narrow the gap 
between rich and poor households is of special relevance 
for Latin America, and it poses a particular challenge for 
international cooperation. If we are to develop appropri-
ate recommendations and advisory services and achieve 
the desired outcomes, we need detailed sectoral analyses. 
We have to consider not only the content of the policies, 
but also the context in which these policies are imple-
mented and by whom. Often we observe that deficiencies 
in policy implementation are not caused by poor policy 
content, but by insufficient implementation capacities. To 
ensure the success of public policies and to provide effec-
tive support, we must answer two basic questions: Which 
institutions can implement public policies efficiently and 
effectively, and how can these institutions adequately ad-
dress specific target groups? 
Following from this, we can see that public policy and 
good governance are inextricably linked. In this regard, 
we must consider what capacities are needed to meet all 
these requirements and how these capacities can be devel-
oped together with the relevant stakeholders. 
This publication reflects the on-going discussions about 
equity in Latin America, a topic we consider highly rel-
evant and worthy of greater attention. To make the study 
accessible to a broader audience, we have supported the 




paper will stimulate the ongoing debate on strengthening 
social cohesion, reducing inequality and improving state-
society relations. 
 
German development cooperation has undergone a 
fundamental reform. Established on 1 January 2011, 
the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusamme-
narbeit (GIZ) GmbH brings together the long-standing 
expertise of the Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED) 
gGmbH (German Development Service), the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
GmbH (German technical cooperation) and InWEnt – 
Capacity Building International, Germany. The present 
study is based on discussions that took place on the 
occasion of a joint event organised by InWEnt and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC) in Santiago de Chile. We are proud to 
present this publication as one of the first to be produced 
by the new Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. It showcases the ongoing 
cooperation measures undertaken by GIZ forerunner 
organisations InWEnt and GTZ with ECLAC, the most 
important regional organisation in Latin America. This 
cooperation and partnership will continue to be of crucial 






Director of the State and Democracy Division GIZ
 
Dr Günther Taube
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Distributive impact of public policy 
stratum, that is, the richest decile of households, as shown 
in figure 3. That decile averages 35% of total income, 
although there is considerable variation around this value. 
While in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Uru-
guay the share of the top decile is 28% of the total, the 
figure exceeds 40% in Brazil and Colombia. At the op-
posite extreme, the stratum consisting of the poorest 40% 
of households averages 15% of total income. The lowest 
figure is for Honduras, where it is below 10%. While the 
gaps between intermediate deciles are less pronounced, 
there is a very clear discrepancy between the highest-
income decile and the second. In the European countries 
the income of the tenth decile is 20% to 30% more than 
that of the ninth, in Latin America that gap tends to be 
over 100% and in some cases it comes close to 200%.
of the tenth decile is 20% to 30% more than that of the 
ninth, in Latin America that gap tends to be over 100% 
and in some cases it comes close to 200%.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this part of the document is to contribute
to discussions of the impact that public policy can have 
in strengthening the link between economic growth and 
distributive equity, a link which has been quite elusive in 
the region’s economic history. The difficulties encountered 
in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of con-
solidating that link are reflected in the idea of an empty 
box, taken from a work by Fernando Fajnzylber (Torres 
Olivos, 2007). In the early 1990s, Fajnzylber constructed 
a double-entry table in which he placed the Latin Ameri-
can countries according to their performance in respect 
of two variables: the income concentration index and 
the growth rate. Only one box remained empty, the one 
which combined high growth with low inequality; that 
was the source of the idea of the “empty box” as a chronic 
deficit in the region and a challenge which still faces its 
analysts and policymakers.
 The chronic inequality affecting Latin America and 
the Caribbean has its roots in the region’s history, going 
back to the privileges of the elite during colonial times, 
and the denial of rights to the great majority of the 
population according to racial and class categories. This 
situation reduced most of the people of the continent to 
slavery at that time. During the republican period, privi-
lege continued to be reproduced through other means 
such as unequal access to land ownership, concentration 
of movable wealth, scant development of public educa-
tion and health care, and racial discrimination; lastly, the 
pattern of development and modernization perpetuated 
socio-economic gaps based on racial and ethnic origin, 
social class and gender. Productive structures and educa-
tional opportunities reinforced patterns of reproduction 
of inequality, and to a great extent are still doing so. The 
region shows levels of inequality in personal income dis-
tribution which are much higher than in the other regions 
of the world, with an average Gini coefficient of 0.53; 
as can be seen in figure 1, this has remained practically 
unchanged for 20 years. The information contained in 
figure 2 confirms the situation of serious inequality in the 
region, where all the Latin American countries have Gini 
indices above 0.4; in most of them the indicator is over 
0.5. The region’s least unequal country is more unequal 
than any of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries or any State in the 
Middle East or North Africa.
 A distinctive feature of the inequality in the region is 
the large fraction of total income captured by the highest 
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40 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
Latin American countries. With the exception of the 
smallest Central American countries and Uruguay (the latter 
having the best indicators of equity and a clearly unitary 
organization), the gaps are very large, unequalled in any 
European country. The per capita GDP of Europe’s richest
area is almost double that of the lowest-income area in the
same country, in Latin America that ratio is about six. 
Figure 1 
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A further dimension of inequality in Latin America, 
of particular interest for policy design, is the level of 
geographical inequality. To illustrate, figure 4 compares
the per capita GDP gap in the richest and poorest
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These indicators reflect the difficulty of the task of 
improving equity and cohesion and show the complexity of 
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 A further dimension of inequality in Latin America,
of particular interest for policy design, is the level of geo-
graphical inequality. To illustrate, figure 4 compares the 
per capita GDP gap in the richest and poorest geographi-
cal areas with per capita GDP for a series of European 
and Latin American countries. With the exception of the
smallest Central American countries and Uruguay (the 
latter having the best indicators of equity and a clearly 
unitary organization), the gaps are very large, unequalled 
in any European country. The per capita GDP of Europe’s 
richest area is almost double that of the lowest-income 
area in the same country, in Latin America that ratio is 
about six. 
 These indicators reflect the difficulty of the task of 
improving equity and cohesion and show the complexity of 
achieving that aim by means of decentralized policies, since 
the poorest areas are exactly those which have the lowest
tax bases for funding the priorities of local public spending
(such as infrastructure, health care and education).
Levels of poverty are another important variable in seek-
ing to understand the situation of the Latin American 
countries, in terms of their ability to generate resources for 
meeting the needs of the population and designing public 
policies to contribute to greater equity. According to the 
Social Panorama of Latin America, 2008 (ECLAC,
2008), the latest available estimates for the Latin American 
countries show that in 2008, 33% of the population were 
living in poverty. Extreme poverty (indigence) affected
12.9% of the population. The total number of people liv-
ing in poverty was 182 million, of whom 71 million were 
indigent.
 Poverty indicators vary substantially among the coun-
tries of the region. The lowest levels of poverty are to be 
found in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, with 
poverty rates below 22% and indigence rates between
3% and 7%, whereas the countries with the highest levels 
of poverty and indigence, exceeding 50% and 30%, 
respectively, are Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The high 
rates of poverty and indigence in these countries have a 
major impact on the ability of the public sector to collect 
taxes, and this restricts the availability of resources for im-
plementing policies to meet the basic needs of the poorest 
segments of society.
40 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
Latin American countries. With the exception of the 
smallest Central American countries and Uruguay (the latter 
having the best indicators of equity and a clearly unitary 
organization), the gaps are very large, unequalled in any 
European country. The per capita GDP of Europe’s richest
area is almost double that of the lowest-income area in the
same country, in Latin America that ratio is about six. 
Figure 1 
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 As the Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (ECLAC) has noted in other publications, 
the period of sustained growth in the region from 2003 
to 2008 saw poverty and indigence fall by eleven and six 
percentage points, respectively, while income concentration 
also fell slightly. These improvements were brought about 
mostly by labour-market forces and, to a lesser extent, by 
trends in demographic variables (falling dependency rates), 
as well as increases in transfers received by households. 
Beyond these positive data, the evidence shows that there 
are still broad social gaps based on two major dimensions: 
first, the capacity of the labour market to generate income 
which can sustain the members of society, and second, the 
capacity of States to support and protect dependants, that is, 
those who have no income or whose employment incomes 
are insufficient.
 The countries with the smallest social divides are those 
which have high GDP, lower demographic dependency 
rates, less informality in their labour markets, and greater 
social security coverage. The public sector also plays a great-
er role in those countries, in terms of the provision of health 
services (smaller proportions of out-of-pocket expenditure) 
and in relation to social spending, which is greater not only 
in per capita terms, but also as a percentage of GDP.
 Direct intervention by the State through the level and 
structure of its tax receipts, as well as monetary transfers to 
low-income groups, has a significant incidence on income 
distribution and poverty. In the OECD countries, the esti-
mated Gini coefficient before taxes and transfers is
0.45, but it falls to 0.31 following the redistributive action of 
the State. On the other hand, ECLAC (2010) shows that in 
some Latin American countries the equivalent variation of 
the Gini index is between half and a third of that observed 
in the developed countries.
 This is because most Latin American countries have 
low tax burdens, regressive tax structures and inappropriate 
orientation of public social spending. The countries of the 
region are faced with the challenges of boosting the receipts 
they collect and also of improving the impact of taxation on 
income distribution, increasing the burden on the wealthier 
sectors. At the same time, it is hoped that the structure of 
the spending financed with those resources can help to 
construct more cohesive societies, increasing the legitimacy 
of public policy and therefore of paying the taxes intended 
to finance them. Demand for more public spending is not 
limited to the social sphere, however; it can include other ar-
eas which, like public investment or productive development 
policies, have an impact on competitiveness, on production 
profiles, and consequently on growth rates and the way in 
which their fruits are distributed. 
 As will be seen in chapter I of this part of the docu-
ment, although there can be no doubt that macroeconomic 
 An additional dimension to be taken into account is
the weight of informality in the economy, an indicator 
which can reflect the composition of employment and the 
extent to which various groups are protected, as well as the
issue of tax evasion. According to estimates by Schneider 
and Enste (2000), Latin America has the highest level of 
informal economic activity of all the world’s regions; it is 
even higher than that in other developing regions.1
 
1 Schneider and Enste note that studies seeking to  measure the underground 
economy are faced, first, with the difficulty of  defining it. The underground 
economy, also known as the parallel or informal economy, includes not only illicit 
activities but also undeclared income from the production of  lawful goods and 
services, involving monetary transactions and barter.
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the poorest areas are exactly those which have the lowest 
tax bases for funding the priorities of local public spending 
(such as infrastructure, health care and education). 
Levels of poverty are another important variable in 
seeking to understand the situation of the Latin American 
countries, in terms of their ability to generate resources 
for meeting the needs of the population and designing 
public policies to contribute to greater equity. According 
to the Social Panorama of Latin America, 2008 (ECLAC, 
2008), the latest available estimates for the Latin American 
countries show that in 2008, 33% of the population were 
living in poverty. Extreme poverty (indigence) affected 
12.9% of the population. The total number of people 
living in poverty was 182 million, of whom 71 million 
were indigent. 
Poverty indicators vary substantially among the 
countries of the region. The lowest levels of poverty are 
to be found in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, 
with poverty rates below 22% and indigence rates between 
3% and 7%, whereas the countries with the highest levels 
of poverty and indigence, exceeding 50% and 30%, 
respectively, are Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The high 
rates of poverty and indigence in these countries have a 
major impact on the ability of the public sector to collect 
taxes, and this restricts the availability of resources for 
implementing policies to meet the basic needs of the 
poorest segments of society. 
extent to which various groups are protected, as well as the 
issue of tax evasion. According to estimates by Schneider 
and Enste (2000), Latin America has the highest level of 
informal economic activity of all the world’s regions; it 
is even higher than that in other developing regions.1 
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the poorest areas are exactly those which have the lowest 
tax bases for funding the priorities of local public spending 
(such as infrastructure, health care and education). 
Levels of poverty are another important variable in 
seeking to understand the situation of the Latin American 
countries, in terms of their ability to generate resources 
for meeting the needs of the population and designing 
public policies to contribute to greater equity. According 
to the Social Panorama of Latin America, 2008 (ECLAC, 
2008), the latest available estimates for the Latin American 
countries show that in 2008, 33% of the population were 
living in poverty. Extreme poverty (indigence) affected 
12.9% of the population. The total number of people 
living in poverty was 182 million, of whom 71 million 
were indigent. 
Poverty indicators vary substantially among the 
countries of the region. The lowest levels of poverty are 
to be found in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay, 
with poverty rates below 22% and indigence rates between 
3% and 7%, whereas the countries with the highest levels 
of poverty and indigence, exceeding 50% and 30%, 
respectively, are Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The high 
rates of poverty and indigence in these countries have a 
major impact on the ability of the public sector to collect 
taxes, and this restricts the availability of resources for 
implementing policies to meet the basic needs of the 
poorest segments of society. 
extent to which various groups are protected, as well as the 
issue of tax evasion. According to estimates by Schneider 
and Enste (2000), Latin America has the highest level of 
informal economic activity of all the world’s regions; it 
is even higher than that in other developing regions.1 
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stability is necessary for the region to be able to grow more 
and share better, that stability goes beyond ensuring low 
and stable inflation rates; it must take account of the need 
to reduce real instability. To achieve this, macroeconomic 
policy design should consider the need to deal with the fluc-
tuations associated with economic cycles, avoiding excessive 
instability in the level and quality of services provided by 
the State, and of key variables such as the real exchange rate 
and interest rates. Furthermore, it is a very important goal 
for low-income groups, whose spending
is restricted by their low saving capacity and limitations on 
their access to the financial market.
 The opportunity that many of the countries of the 
region have had recently to implement a variety of measures 
to alleviate the impact of the worldwide crisis on economic 
activity and the social situation has revalued the role of 
the State and of active policies; however, at the same time, 
it exposed the huge differences between the countries of 
the region in terms of their capacity to implement those 
policies. This has underlined the importance of broadening 
the public policy domain, strengthening instruments to 
follow up the agreed goals, ensuring the availability of any 
resources needed for financing the initiatives to be put into 
practice and strengthening the institutions responsible for 
implementing them.
 This document will focus on the distributive impact of 
a limited set of public policies. Chapter I will consider the 
consequences for income distribution of macroeconomic 
volatility, the way in which the latter affects the labour 
market, and policy options for dealing with it. Chapter II 
is dedicated to analysis of the distributive impacts of tax 
policy, and chapter III deals with social spending. Lastly, 
chapter IV will take stock and draw overall conclusions.
 The fact that the analysis focuses on certain aspects of 
public policy imposes certain constraints. First, the distribu-
tive effects of other elements of public spending aside from 
social spending will not be considered; neither will the indi-
rect effects of general fiscal strategy or other macroeconomic 
areas such as interest-rate or exchange- rate policies. The sec-
ond limitation of the analysis is that distributive incidence 
and impacts will always be dealt with in a static manner and 
from the viewpoint of partial equilibrium. The analysis of 
the distributive impact of education or health-care spend-
ing, for example, does not consider its possible effects on the 
potential future earnings of the recipients. Also not taken 
into account are the possible interactions among the various 
policies analysed, nor between them and the behaviour of 
economic agents and their subsequent distributive impacts.
  
 
economies are closely related to external shocks (such as 
sudden trend reversals in capital flows or sharp varia-
tions in the terms of trade).3 Such fluctuations tend to be 
accompanied by changes in the sustainability prospects 
for public and external debt and increased fragility in the 
financial system. They have often led to adjustment proc-
esses, often including major shifts in relative prices (and, 
therefore, in income distribution) and in the organiza-
tional structures of economic activity (private contracts, 
public regulation, property rights).
 Macroeconomic volatility, as a source of or the reflec-
tion of underdevelopment (Chang, Kaltani and Loayza, 
2009) has therefore been a subject of particular interest in 
analysing the external performance of the Latin American 
and Caribbean region. Level of macroeconomic volatil-
ity is associated with a variety of elements, which differ 
according to each country’s specific features, including its 
pattern of international integration, productive structure, 
economic policy, vulnerability to natural disasters and 
institutional framework (ECLAC, 2004, 2008). 
 A number of studies have found a negative correla-
tion between volatility and GDP growth. While the 
channels interconnecting these variables are not easy to 
identify, there is a degree of consensus that sharp varia-
tions in investment play a key role.4  Given the imperfect 
credit markets common in peripheral economies, the fall 
in investment during the recessionary phase of the cycle 
exceeds the upturn that ensues during the expansion-
ary phase, resulting in a negative balance. Increased risk 
aversion among investors during turbulent periods in the 
region, when crises involve several countries at the same 
time, can put abrupt an end to slow-maturing projects, 
damaging investment efficiency.
3 ECLAC has emphasized these links since its  beginnings (see Prebisch, 1949 and 
Rodríguez, 2006).
4 See ECLAC (2008) and the bibliography quoted therein.
2. Macroeconomic volatility, employment 
and income distribution
Macroeconomic policy analysis makes little reference to dis-
tributive issues, yet this area of policymaking often has major 
implications for distribution, which generate complex dilemmas 
between actions which have different impacts on various social 
groups. It is therefore important to consider the possible dis-
tributive impacts of the different tools of macroeconomic policy, 
such as the management of monetary aggregates, the level and 
composition of public spending, or the proportion of revenue 
obtained from different types of taxation.
 
 As mentioned above, the concern of ECLAC with mac-
roeconomic stability is not limited to the need to achieve 
the lowest and most stable inflation possible; it is also aware 
of the huge costs of real instability in Latin America, not 
only from the growth perspective, but also in terms of its 
impact on poverty and inequality. Thus, as Raúl Prebisch 
wrote more than 60 years ago: “Anti-cyclical policies must 
be included in any programmes of economic development if 
there is to be an attempt, from a social point of view, to raise 
real income. The spread of the cyclical fluctuations of the 
large centres to the Latin-American periphery means a con-
siderable loss of income to these countries. If this could be 
avoided, it would simplify the problem of capital formation. 
Attempts have been made to evolve an anti-cyclical policy, 
but it must be admitted that, as yet, but little light has been 
thrown on this subject” (Prebisch, 1950).
2.1 Characteristics of volatility in Latin 
America and the Caribbean
An analysis of aggregate fluctuations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean shows that the region has shown very 
high volatility compared with more developed countries. 
The variance of the growth rate in 1951-2008 in Latin 
America is 50% higher than in Europe and the United 
States (Kacef and Jiménez, 2010).
 At the same time, as figure 7.2 shows, there have 
frequently been episodes which may be described as 
crises, some of which have sharply curtailed growth or 
even caused a production collapse, that is, a drop in the 
absolute value of per capita GDP.1 There have also been 
frequent shocks which altered long-term trends, con-
trasting with temporary turmoil which, by definition, is 
followed by a return to the mean. 
 Economists who subscribe to structuralist theories 
have argued repeatedly that fluctuations in the region’s 
2 ECLAC (2008) offers a number of  relevant definitions. 
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Another stylized fact is that consumption is more volatile than 
GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean (Toledo, 2008). The 
high volatility of consumption means that poverty rates are also 
very changeable, particularly when there is a high density of 
households with per capita incomes close to the poverty line. In 
these circumstances, falling incomes and consumption can leave 
large numbers of people below the poverty or indigence line.
 
2.2 The consequences of volatility5 
1. For well-being 
The impact of volatility on well-being is measured in terms
of falling per capita consumption resulting from slower 
economic growth. Volatility causes creation and destruction 
of wealth through changes in relative prices and in property 
rights. The uncertainty this causes discourages investment 
and holds down growth and employment.
 When consumption is more volatile than income, as is 
the case in the region, the same is true of the impact on well-
being.6 Furthermore, as mentioned above, highly volatile 
consumption means highly volatile poverty, especially where 
there are many households with per capitaincomes close to 
the poverty line. In these conditions, a relatively sharp fall 
in consumption can leave many people below the minimum 
income level needed in order to satisfy their needs. Two 
examples illustrate this connection: Mexico, where the crisis 
of 1995 raised the percentage of poor from 45.1% in 1994 to 
5 For more detail, see Kacef  and Jiménez (2010). 
6 Pallage and Robe (2001) note that the volatility of  consumption has a high cost for 
developing countries. To bring that volatility to the same level as in the developed 
countries would be equivalent to increasing the GDP growth rate by 0.34 percentage 
points in perpetuity.
52.9% in 1996; and Argentina, where the 2002 crisis pushed 




2. For the labour market and income distribution
In a region which, like Latin America and the Caribbean, is
characterized by sharp inequalities and marked uneven-
ness in the access of different social groups to the goods 
and services produced in the economy, equity cannot be 
increased without considering the differential impacts of 
volatility on the well-being of different income groups. From 
a macroeconomic perspective, this unevenness has a number 
of dimensions, beyond the vulnerability, as mentioned of the 
lowest income groups to fluctuations in consumption due to 
their proximity to the subsistence level. One of these dimen-
sions has to do with the differential impacts of volatility on 
employment (Weller, 2010).
 Both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 
show that high volatility in economic growth is counterpro-
ductive, both for the generation of quality employment and 
for equality.7 The literature on human capital notes that in 
many cases, workers’ skills are acquired by practice, dur-
ing the actual production process. Some of that increased 
human capital is specific to the post and to the technology 
of the particular place of work, so it is likely to lose its value 
when the worker changes jobs. As a result, high rotation 
resulting from high macroeconomic volatility has a depress-
ing effect on workforce productivity and income. 
 Even in periods of relative macroeconomic stability, 
however, the region’s labour markets show high levels of 
rotation.8 It is sometimes argued that this facilitates reassign-
ment of the workforce from declining enterprises and sectors 
towards new sectors and expanding businesses. Empiri-
cal data, however, show that during the structural reform 
period, intersectoral labour migrations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean did not take place from low-productivity to 
high-productivity segments, but the reverse (Pagés, Pierre 
and Scarpetta, 2009).
 Not all workers are hit equally hard by job losses during 
periods of economic instability. Businesses are usually more 
interested in keeping their more highly-skilled workers but, 
with regard to less-skilled workers, tend to adopt profit-
maximizing strategies involving increased use of short-term 
contracts and outsourcing. Thus, at the microeconomic level, 
the speed of rotation (Cowan and Micco, 2005), and less 
educated workers suffer greater income instability than their 
more skilled colleagues (Beccaria and Groisman, 2006).
7 See Farber (1999), Auer, Berg and Coulibaly (2005) and Perry and others (2006).
8 See Calderón-Madrid (2000), Cowan and others (2005) and SPTyEL (2005).
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A. Characteristics of volatility in Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
investment play a key role.3  Given the imperfect credit 
markets common in peripheral economies, the fall in 
investment during the recessionary phase of the cycle 
exceeds the upturn that ensues during the expansionary 
phase, resulting in a negative balance. Increased risk 
aversion among investors during turbulent periods in the 
region, when crises involve several countries at the same 
time, can put abrupt an end to slow-maturing projects, 
damaging investment efficiency. 
An analysis of aggregate fluctuations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean shows that the region has shown very 
high volatility compared with more developed countries. 
The variance of the growth rate in 1951-2008 in Latin 
America is 50% higher than in Europe and the United 
States (Kacef and Jiménez, 2010). 
At the same time, as figure I.1 shows, there have 
frequently been episodes which may be described as 
crises, some of which have sharply curtailed growth or 
even caused a production collapse, that is, a drop in the 
absolute value of per capita GDP.1 There have also been 
frequent shocks which altered long-term trends, contrasting 
with temporary turmoil which, by definition, is followed 
by a return to the mean. 
Economists who subscribe to structuralist theories 
have argued repeatedly that fluctuations in the region’s 
economies are closely related to external shocks (such as 
sudden trend reversals in capital flows or sharp variations 
in the terms of trade).2   Such fluctuations tend to be 
accompanied by changes in the sustainability prospects 
for public and external debt and increased fragility in 
the financial system. They have often led to adjustment 
processes, often including major shifts in relative prices 
(and, therefore, in income distribution) and in the 
organizational structures of economic activity (private 
contracts, public regulation, property rights). 
Macroeconomic volatility, as a source of or the 
reflection of underdevelopment (Chang, Kaltani and Loayza,
2009) has therefore been a subject of particular interest in 
analysing the external performance of the Latin American 
and Caribbean region. Level of macroeconomic volatility 
is associated with a variety of elements, which differ 
according to each country’s specific features, including its 
pattern of international integration, productive structure, 
economic policy, vulnerability to natural disasters and 
institutional framework (ECLAC, 2004, 2008). 
A number of studies have found a negative correlation 
between volatility and GDP growth. While the channels 
interconnecting these variables are not easy to identify, 
there is a degree of consensus that sharp variations in 
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high volatility the incomes of poorer households fluctu-
ate more severely and unemployment is worse among the 
poorer strata (see figure 9); and that lack of employment 
opportunities pushes workers towards informality (see fig-
ure 10). Those impacts are often long-lasting, since crisis 
episodes have consequences in terms of employment, pov-
erty and inequity which are remedied only slowly during 
expansionary periods. Crises also lead many young people 
from lower-income households to leave the educational 
system and enter the labour market. This tends to rein-
force the perpetuation of poverty and inequality.
 The unevenness is also reflected in differences in access 
to markets, particularly financial markets and, as a result, 
unequal ability to cushion the impact of volatility. These 
characteristics imply that high-income and low-income 
groups have widely differing ranges of choices available to 
them. In particular, given their capacity for saving and gen-
erating stocks of wealth, the high-income groups can diver-
sify their risk-taking in order to protect their capital from 
internal volatility; they can also use their assets or, possibly, 
their access to credit, to moderate the impact of income 
fluctuations on consumption.10 In relatively high-inflation 
economies, they are better able to avoid the resulting tax 
on cash assets by moving their capital to alternative assets 
whose value is better protected from the effects of inflation. 
Low-income groups, on the other hand, are constrained in 
their opportunities to anticipate and prevent shocks and 
therefore suffer strong impacts when they occur (Krusell, 
Kuruscu and Smith, 2002).
10 Indeed, given the high concentration of wealth, they have a greater capacity to influence 
volatility directly through the impact of their own decisions on saving, investment and the 
composition of their investment portfolios.
 Comparison of the volatility of economic growth with 
that of real wages and unemployment rates for the period 
from the early 1990s to 2006 shows a number of patterns 
of labour-market adjustment among the Latin American 
countries. Figure 8 shows that in Chile, Guatemala and 
Peru, there are strong correlations both between the volatility 
of economic growth and that of the unemployment rate, 
and between the volatility of the growth rate and that of real 
wages. In Costa Rica and Uruguay the correlation is greater 
in the case of unemployment (adjustment resting more on 
variations in employment levels); this is also the case in 
Colombia and Panama, where the correlation in the case of 
wages is actually negative. 
 In Brazil, Mexico and Nicaragua the correlation is 
high for wages but somewhat lower for employment (more 
adjustment via real wages). Lastly, Argentina, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay and the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia show low or negative correlations in 
both cases. In those countries, the labour-market adjustment 
apparently takes place through the informal labour market 
or emigration.9 
 Another dimension of the distributive impact of 
volatility involves types and levels of market integration 
(between formality and informality, for example), because 
of sharp disparities in the effects of policies on different 
groups. In Latin America and the Caribbean, at times of 
9 Other authors, agreeing that there is a variety of  adjustment mechanisms in the labour 
market, have found other patterns. For example, Ros (2006) shows three distinct ways in 
which, during the period  1990-2002, the countries of the region adapted  to the insuffi-
cient creation of formal employment: (i) through the expansion of informal jobs (Brazil, 
Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Peru); (ii) through the expansion of informality and the 
growth of unemployment (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Costa Rica); (iii) mainly 
through higher unemployment (Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay). Ros also mentions that falls 
in real wages during the same period were not part of the adjustment mechanism.
12
46 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
Comparison of the volatility of economic growth with 
that of real wages and unemployment rates for the period 
from the early 1990s to 2006 shows a number of patterns 
of labour-market adjustment among the Latin American 
countries. Figure I.2 shows that in Chile, Guatemala and 
Peru, there are strong correlations both between the volatility 
of economic growth and that of the unemployment rate, 
and between the volatility of the growth rate and that of 
real wages. In Costa Rica and Uruguay the correlation is 
greater in the case of unemployment (adjustment resting 
m re on v riatio s in employm nt levels); this is also the 
case in Colombia and Panama, where the correlation in 
the case of wages s actually negative. 
In Brazil, Mexico and Nicaragua the correlation 
is high for wages but somewhat lower for employment 
(more adjustment via real wages). Lastly, Argentina, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia show low or 
negative correlations in both cases. In those countries, the 
labour-market adjustment apparently takes place through 
the informal labour market or emigration.8 
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Comparison of the volatility of economic growth with 
that of real wages and unemployment rates for the period 
from the early 1990s to 2006 shows a number of patterns 
of labour-market adjustment among the Latin American 
countries. Figure I.2 shows that in Chile, Guate ala and 
Peru, there are strong correlations both between the volatility 
of economic growth and that of the unemployment rate, 
and between the volatility of the growth rate and that of 
real wages. In Costa Rica and Uruguay the correlation is 
greater in the case f unemployment (adjustment resting 
more on variations in employment levels); this is also the 
case in Colombi  and Pana a, wh re the correl tion in 
the case of wages is actually negative. 
In Brazil, Mexico and Nicaragua the correlation 
is high for wages but somewhat lower for employment 
(more adjustment via real ages). Lastly, Argentina, the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Paraguay 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia show low or 
negative correlations in both cases. In those countries, the 
labour-market adjustment apparently takes place through 
the informal labo r arket or emigration.8 
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the resulting tax on cash assets by moving their capital 
to alternative assets whose value is better protected from 
the effects of inflation. Low-income groups, on the other 
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and prevent shocks and therefore suffer strong impacts 
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3. For the macroeconomic policy space
In the Latin America and Caribbean region, the mag-
nitude of policy space can change very quickly after a 
shock. Macroeconomic volatility shapes the policy area 
not only by influencing resources, but also by determin-
ing the intensity with which other policies compete with 
those of stabilization, and because it often limits the 
quantity of policy tools available (for example, during cri-
ses the market for new public borrowing may disappear). 
When a negative shock occurs, as in 2008-2009, demand 
from the affected sectors increases and there is intensi-
fied competition for the use of both resources and policy 
instruments, which are structurally scarce in the region.
 These factors create a two-way relationship between 
the fiscal function of stabilization and macroeconomic 
imbalances and shocks: fiscal policies seek to correct im-
balances opened up by shocks, but shocks and imbalances 
constrain policymaking capacity by leaving less room for 
manoeuvre. Fiscal policy is a good example of this effect. 
As GDP falls, tax receipts are reduced and the borrowing 
capacity of the public sector often suffers where access to 
capital markets is procyclical.
 As can be seen in figure 12, tax receipts in the region
are highly volatile —volatility is almost three times 
higher, on average, than in the developed countries, as 
measured by the standard deviation of these revenues 
(Gómez-Sabaini and Jiménez, 2009). This volatility has 
a greater impact on the most vulnerable population seg-
ments, through the fluctuations it produces in public so-
cial spending. In many countries, tax receipts are doubly 
affected by external shocks (directly, and also indirectly 
through the level of economic activity). 
 All this is worsened by the highly procyclical nature of 
access to financing for the countries of the region. Together 
with the combination of scarce and volatile resources and 
unmet social needs, this generates procyclical spending 
policies. This is confirmed by the data in figure 13, which 
shows the 30-year trend in the coefficient of correlation 
between government spending and GDP. Spending is seen 
to be increasingly procyclical (at least up to the late 1990s), 
unlike what has occurred in the developed economies. 
This implies that in Latin America and the Caribbean the 
State’s capacity to provide welfare assistance falls during 
recessionary periods (ECLAC, 2006), adding a further 
element of volatility to the consumption of the poor (de 
Ferranti and others, 2002) whose incomes are significantly 
supplemented by social spending (see figure 14).
 Through these channels, volatility generates higher
inequality (see figure 11). According to a study by Cal-
derón and Levy-Yeyati (2009) for 75 countries, the Gini 
coefficient is positively and significantly associated with 
macroeconomic volatility. At the same time, macroeco-
nomic volatility is negatively correlated with incomes in 
the first three quintiles of income distribution but posi-
tively correlated with income in the two highest quintiles.
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Figure 
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the basis of César Calderón and Eduardo Levy-Yeyati, “Zooming in: from 
aggregate volatility to income distribution”, Policy Research Working Paper 
s ries, No. 4895, World Bank, 2009.
a     These are panel estimates on 75 countries for 1975-2005, with five-year intervals.
 The dependent variable is the logarithm of the Gini coefficient and the income share 
per quintile and the independent variable is the deviation of GDP growth. The control 
variables included are the Gini coefficient (t-1), real income per person, the square 
of real income per person, the rate of secondary educational enrolment, the rate of 
inflation and government spending as a percentage of GDP. 
b     St tistically significant at 5%. 
c      Statistically significant at 10%. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information from the respective countries. 
Through these channels, volatility generates higher 
inequality (see figure I.5). According to a study by 
Calderón and Levy-Yeyati (2009) for 75 countries, the Gini 
coefficient is positively and significantly associated with 
macroeconomic volatility. At the same time, macroeconomic 
volatility is negatively correlated with incomes in the 
first three quintiles of income distribution but positively 
correlated with come in the two highest quintiles. 
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of policy tools available (for example, during crises the 
market for new public borrowing may disappear). When 
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imbalances constrain policymaking capacity by leaving 
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As can be seen in figure I.6, tax receipts in the region 
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with the combination of scarce and volatile resources and 
unmet social needs, this generates procyclical spending 
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In many countries, tax receipts are doubly affected by 
external shocks (directly, and also indirectly through the 
level of economic activity). 
All this is worsened by the highly procyclical nature of 
access to financing for the countries of the region. Together 
with the combination of scarce and volatile resources and 
unmet social needs, this generates procyclical spending 
policies. This is confirmed by the data in figure I.7, which 
shows the 30-year trend in the coefficient of correlation 
between government spending and GDP. Spending is seen 
to be increasingly procyclical (at least up to the late 1990s), 
unlike what has occurred in the developed economies. 
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4. Macroeconomic volatility and public policies
As described above, macroeconomic volatility affects the 
growth and stability of consumption and gives rise to 
sudden, undesirable changes in income distribution and 
in the allocation of property rights; as a result, it generally 
leads to distributive conflicts. Such situations tend to be 
worsened by the negative impact of macroeconomic vola-
tility on the quantity and quality of public policies. One 
set of policies may gain ascendance over others, damaging 
the governance of economic activity (ECLAC, 2008). 
 This impact of volatility on well-being, income distri-
bution and the macroeconomic domain will affect the po-
litical and social situation and produce social tension and 
distributive conflicts, worsening the instability. Following 
Alesina and Perotti (1996), who established a causal link 
between equity, stability in democratic institutions and 
growth, it could be said that real volatility has an impact 
at both ends (equity and growth) and creates a vicious 
cycle which may damage democratic governance. This 
is why a strategy to improve income distribution must 
include the generation of fiscal space for implementing 
policies on the basis of resource saving and asset accumu-
lation or the generation of borrowing capacity.
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recessionary periods (ECLAC, 2006), adding a further 
element of volatility to the consumption of the poor (de 
Ferranti and others, 2002) whose incomes are significantly 
supplemented by social spending (see figure I.8). 
Figure I.7 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a     For each country, correlation coefficients were calculated between the variation
of government spending and that of economic growth, for 15-year moving
windows; subsequently, the average of the coefficients was calculated for the
countries of each region. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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2.3 Characteristics of growth and its  
distributive impact
 
Some 80% of household  income  is derived from 
employment (waged or own-account). For this reason, la-
bour market determines much of income distribution and 
the economy’s capacity to generate employment and the 
characteristics of the jobs created are vitally important.11  
 In the region, the creation of jobs, especially waged 
and formal jobs, is closely associated with economic 
growth. But since many households need to generate 
labour income simply to subsist, when economic activ-
ity levels are low or falling —and demand for labour is 
consequently weak— self-employment operates as an 
adjustment and adaptation mechanism in avoidance of 
open unemployment (ECLAC and ILO, 2010). Thus, 
a proportion of employment in the region arises out of 
labour supply pressure caused by subsistence needs. Com-
parison between countries tends to reveal a high correla-
tion between demographic change and the variation of 
the number of employed persons (Weller, 2000, p. 77).
 Since the employment rate for the region as a whole 
reacts strongly to growth pattern changes, Latin America 
and the Caribbean clearly does not offer an example of 
“jobless growth”. On the contrary, many Latin American 
and Caribbean countries have in the past evidenced a 
process of “growthless jobs”, in other words, employment 
creation amid very low growth (Pagés, Pierre and Scar-
petta, 2009). These jobs tend to be low-productivity and 
low-waged jobs and have negative distributive impacts.
 When the behaviours of the employment and eco-
nomic growth rates are analysed in relation to each other, 
a group of countries emerges with a positive correlation of 
over 0.5 between changes in the two variables: Argentina, 
Barbados, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Uruguay. On the other hand, the correlation is low in 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Jamaica and Peru, and actually negative in the Plurina-
tional State of Bolivia (see figure 15). 
 
 
11 For a simple average of 17 Latin American  countries in 2005,employment income de-
termined 77.3% of the Gini coefficient of total income; with the exception of Uruguay, 
the countries were all within the 70%-90% range. In the same year, the Gini coefficient 
for employment income averaged 0.536, ranging from 0.452 in Costa Rica to 0.587 in 
Honduras (Medina and Galván, 2008).
 The fact that the correlation coefficients are higher in
countries with higher average incomes, while the coun-
tries with lower coefficients are typically those with lower 
per capita GDP, appears to be consistent with the hypoth-
esis described above. In the second group of countries, the 
pressure of labour supply is inflexible in relation to the 
cycle, and subsistence needs force households to generate 
employment income regardless of variations in demand. 
 This type of self-generated jobs is characterized by 
lowproductivity and quality. On the other hand, as men-
tioned in the previous chapter, countries with relatively 
high per capita incomes tend to have a more formal la-
bour market, higher levels of social protection and lower 
rates of poverty and indigence (Uthoff, 2010).12
 As discussed so far, economic growth and its volatil-
ity, as well as demographic change, affect the pressure of 
labour supply and have a major impact on the generation 
of employment and on its composition. But other
variables, many related to the nature of economic 
growth, also influence equality outcomes in the labour 
market. These include the diversity of the productive 
structure and of the workforce, biases in labour demand 
by educational level, the quality of employment in terms 
of social protection,  and the possession of attributes 
which are the object  of discrimination (such as gender,  
religion  and country  of origin). 
12 Means of generating resources to fund public policies for improved equality are dealt 
with in the next chapter.
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This impact of volatility on well-being, income 
distribution and the macroeconomic domain will affect the 
political and social situation and produce social tension and 
distributive conflicts, worsening the instability. Following 
Alesina and Perotti (1996), who established a causal link 
between equity, stability in democratic institutions and 
growth, it could be said that real volatility has an impact at 
both ends (equity and growth) and creates a vicious cycle 
which may damage democratic governance. This is why 
a strategy to improve income distribution must include 
the generation of fiscal space for implementing policies 
on the basis of resource saving and asset accumulation 
or the generation of borrowing capacity. 
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adjustment and adaptation mechanism in avoidance of 
open unemployment (ECLAC and ILO, 2010). Thus, a 
proportion of employment in the region arises out of labour 
supply pressure caused by subsistence needs. Comparison 
between countries tends to reveal a high correlation between 
demographic change and the variation of the number of 
employed persons (Weller, 2000, p. 77). 
Since the employment rate for th  region as a whole 
reacts str ngly to growth pattern changes, Latin America 
and the Caribbean clearly does not offer an example of 
“jobless growth”. On the contrary, any Latin American and 
Caribbean countries have in the past evidenced a process 
of “growthless jobs”, in other words, employment creation 
amid very low growth (Pagés, Pierre and Scarpetta, 2009). 
These jobs tend to be low-productivity and low-waged 
jobs and have negative distributive impacts. 
When the behaviours of the employment and economic 
growth rates are analysed in relation to each other, a group 
of countries emerges with a positive correlation of over 0.5 
between changes in the two variables: Argentina, Barbados, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. On 
the other hand, the correlation is low in Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica and 
Peru, and actually negative in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia (see figure I.9). 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
COEFFICIENT OF CORRELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH 








Source: Jurgen Weller, “Contexto macro, empleo e impacto distributivo”, document 
presented in the workshop on distributive impact in public policies, Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Santiago, Chile, 
28- 29 April 2010. 
The fact that the correlation coefficients are higher in 
countries with higher average incomes, while the countries 
with lower coefficients are typically those with lower per 
capit  GDP, appears to be consistent with e ypothesis 
de cribed above. In the second group of c tries, 
ressure of labour su ply is inflexible in relation to the 
cycle, and subsistence needs force households to generate 
employment income regardless of variations in demand. 
10 For a simple average of 17 Latin American  countries in
2005, 
employment income determined 77.3% of the Gini coefficient of 
total income; with the exception of Uruguay, the countries were all 
within the 70%-90% range. In the same year, the Gini coefficient 
for employment income averaged 0.536, ranging from 0.452 in 
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1. Distributive aspects of the production structure
It follows from the discussion in the previous section that 
the creation of jobs in sectors of widely varying productiv-
ity levels has a major impact on income distribution. The 
employment structure deteriorated during the 1990s and 
up to the early 2000s (though this was partly reversed in 
the mid-2000s), with the share of low-productivity sectors 
in urban employment growing from 47.2% in 1990 to 
50.8% in 2002, before falling back to 47.4% in 2007.13 
 The relative weakness in the creation of productive 
jobs in the 1990s was also reflected in a widening of the 
income gap between enterprises of different sizes. The ra-
tio of average wages in microenterprises to those in small, 
medium-sized and large enterprises fell from 73% in 
the early 1990s to 62% around 2002. There was an even 
greater fall in the incomes of non-technical own-account
workers, whose incomes fell from 99% to 73% of average 
wages for small, medium-sized and large businesses. Dur-
ing the following years (data up to 2006), however, when 
there was an increase in waged job creation jobs in formal 
enterprises, those gaps narrowed somewhat, to 66% in 
the case of microenterprises and to 75% for own-account 
workers (ECLAC, 2010b).
 As mentioned above, therefore, it may be concluded 
that because of structural productive heterogeneity, a 
low-growth phase tends to worsen income distribution, 
whereas faster growth provides a more favourable context 
for cutting inequalities. Likewise, it is possible to identity 
sectoral patterns of job creation which favour or threaten 
poverty reduction efforts.14
2. The impact on wage inequalities of shifts in the com-
position of labour supply and demand
Wage inequality is partly due to the gap between workers
with different skill levels. One notable outcome is that, 
for comparable occupations, the wage gap between more 
and less skilled employees has been found to be wider in 
the poorer countries (Freeman and Oostendorp, 2000).
Contrary to the expectations generated by the main 
schools of economic thought in the 1990s, both national 
case studies and comparative analyses have shown that, 
just as in the more developed countries, Latin America 
and the Caribbean saw a widening of the wage gap.15 
13 Simple average of 15 countries (calculated on the basis of ECLAC (2010b), table 18 of  
the statistical appendix).
14 Gutierrez and others (2007) found that intensive growth of employment in manufac-
turing industry fostered poverty reduction, whereas the same trend in agriculture led to 
increased poverty. 
15 See national examples in Robbins (1994),  Pavcnik  and others (2002), Altimir, Beccaria 
and González Rosada  (2002) and Arabsheibani, Carneiro and Henley  (2003); and 
comparative studies in Behrman,  Birdsall and Szekely (2000), IDB (2003) and Contreras 
and Gallegos (2007).
16 |
 Despite improvements in the educational structure of 
the workforce, which provided more skilled workers, the 
incomes of the most highly qualified increased in relation 
to parts of the workforce with fewer years of formal edu-
cation. The income gap between those with least school-
ing and workers with intermediate educational levels has 
not widened, perhaps because of the strong increase in the 
supply of labour with secondary education.
 There were expectations in Latin America and the
Caribbean that economic reforms, especially trade and 
financial liberalization, as well as the deregulation of 
labour markets, would promote the use of the most 
abundant factor, presumably less-skilled workers, thereby 
increasing their employment and their income. Since the 
empirical evidence has contradicted that hypothesis, a 
number of explanations have been offered for the failure 
of the conventional theory:
•  A worldwide technological change tending to favour 
skilled workers, facilitated by trade liberalization and 
the growth of foreign direct investment, which has 
changed the composition of factors in the region’s 
productive structure through imports of capital goods. 
This caused labour demand to lean towards the higher-
skilled strata, widening the income gap between differ-
ent categories of the workforce.16
•  The comparative advantages of many of the countries of 
the region are based not on abundant unskilled labour, 
as had been suggested, but on their natural-resource 
assets (de Ferranti and others, 2002).
•  Massive competition on world markets from countries 
with large reserves of unskilled, low-waged labour put 
global pressure on the wages of workers in this category 
(Freeman, 2005a).
•  It has also been argued that macroeconomic policies, 
particularly exchange-rate and monetary policies, have 
•  sometimes worked unfavourably on relative prices, 
by raising the cost of labour in relation to capital (Lora 
and Olivera, 1998; Ramírez and Núñez, 2000). Since 
capital and skilled labour are usually complementary 
factors, as long as capital and unskilled labour can sub-
stitute each other, these policies would have a regressive 
impact on distribution.
•  Institutional factors such as a falling or stagnant real 
minimal wage and the weakening of trade unions may 
also have been important (Cortéz, 2001).
 
 In recent years the widening of the wage gap appears 
to have stopped, and indeed to have reversed itself partial-
16 See Robbins (1996), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Sánchez-Páramo and Schady (2003) 
and Jaumotte, Lall and Papageorgiou (2008).
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ly. The relative incomes of workers with the most school-
ing have fallen in relation to those of the most unskilled, 
but have not returned to the levels of the early 1990s. It 
should also be noted that —with very small variations 
during both phases— between the early 1990s and 2006-
2008, the gap between the least skilled and the group 
with nine to twelve years’ schooling narrowed (with the 
coefficient rising from 68.1% to 72.6% for waged work-
ers and from 54.7% to 70.0% for all employed persons) 
(ECLAC, 2010b). In light of developments with respect 
to education, one interpretation for this is that the in-
crease in the supply of labour with intermediate and, in 
the 2000s, higher educational credentials has had a hand 
in reducing those groups’ relative income.17 
 
3. Macroeconomic volatility and the quality of  
employment
The greater or lesser availability of quality jobs (defined as full-
time jobs, without a predetermined end date, and with some 
degree of social protection) is partly determined by the level 
and volatility of economic growth. 
 As mentioned above, between the mid-1990s and the 
early 2000s, when the unemployment rate rose with each crisis 
but failed to fall to its pre-crisis level during boom periods, 
workers displaced from the formal system resorted increasingly 
to informality and precarious and self-generated employment. 
In addition, labour reforms in some countries facilitated the 
use of fixed-term employment contracts, creating additional 
flexibility at the periphery which caused increased instability 
and insecurity in formal employment. 
 On the other hand, the experience of recent years dem-
onstrates how important a favourable economic situation is in 
underpinning a process of improvement in employment qual-
ity. Together with falls in unemployment and in the propor-
tion of jobs in low-productivity sectors, there was an increase 
in the percentage of the urban population enjoying some level 
of social protection. 
 Between 2000 and 2007, the percentage of the urban 
employed with pension or health protection, or both, rose 
from 54.5% to 60.8% (weighted average) (ILO 2009, table 
8-A). As well as economic growth and rising formal-sector 
employment, this was partly due to a fall in informal employ-
ment by formal businesses during that period of relatively high 
growth.18 In a number of countries, more stringent inspection 
practices played a significant part in this.19
17 Monsueto, Machado and Golgher (2006), as well as Castro Lugo and Huesca Reynoso 
(2007) and Airola and Juhn (2008) reported for Brazil and Mexico,  respectively, recent 
reductions in wage inequality by educational level.
18 Between 2005 and 2007, taking an average of five  countries, informal wage employment 
in the formal sector fell from 36.9% to 31.6% (ILO, 2008).
19 For the case of Brazil see Simão (2009).
4. Inequalities reflecting patterns of labour market 
participation by disadvantaged groups
Lastly, some specific groups encounter particular prob-
lems in the labour market. On the one hand, there are 
constraints on labour-market access —on both supply 
and demand sides— for women, for example, particularly 
those with little schooling. On the other hand, horizon-
tal and vertical occupational segmentation and wage dis-
crimination lead to workers with similar characteristics 
—except for the trait that occasions the discrimination— 
receiving unequal benefits. Gender and ethnic origin are 
the main grounds for discrimination.
 Analysis of the statistics shows that the participation 
rate of women living in urban areas rose significantly in 
the 1990s, but has increased only slightly in recent years. 
Much of the rise was due to improved educational levels 
among the female workforce; this improved their labour- 
market integration, owing to the strong correlation be-
tween women’s educational levels and their labour-market 
participation. On the other hand, participation by women 
with fewer years of schooling increased only moderately, 
and has recently slowed (ECLAC, 2010b).
 The female urban unemployment rate has reflected 
economic trends in the region, rising sharply between 
1990 and around 2003, then dropping back to a level 
comparable to that of the early 1990s. The unemploy-
ment gap between men and women widened during both 
periods.
 As in the case of unemployment, women’s employ-
ment in low productivity sectors reflected developments 
in the region’s economy, rising in the early 1990s and 
subsequently
falling. Here, the gender gap narrowed during the first 
phase, perhaps as a result of sociocultural pressure on 
many men (as, traditionally, the principal breadwinners 
in the household) to accept any employment they could 
find, even in very low-productivity sectors.
 The income gap between men and women narrowed 
in the 1990s (both for wage earners and for the broader 
employed population), both overall and for each of the 
three educational groups. In the 2000s, however, the gap 
has narrowed very slightly at the aggregate level while 
widening in some educational groups (ECLAC, 2010b).
 In sum, although some of the gender gaps in the la-
bour market have narrowed, access to that market and 
to productive employment is still highly unequal for the 
two sexes. This inequality is partly due to sociocultural 
factors which attribute to women a specific role centred 
on reproduction and unpaid domestic work, and also to 
differential access to assets (especially human capital) and 
to labour-market institutions designed according to the 
traditional model of the male breadwinner. 
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 Other discrimination mechanisms persist in labour 
markets. Studies indicate that there is still wage discrimi-
nation against members of ethnic minorities;20 they have 
also identified a wage gap based on workers’ socio-eco-
nomic origin.21
20 Atal, Ñopo and Winder (2009) report that the wage gap between persons belonging 
to ethnic groups which have difficulties with labour-market integration and the rest of  
the population is 37.8%. If  observable  variables affecting relative wages are taken into 
account, that gap falls to 12.9%, showing that a large part of the gap is due to problems 
with access to productive employment that are related to factors external to the labour 
market.
21 See Núñez and Gutiérrez (2004) and Gaviria, Medina and Palau (2007).
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social security and housing has major impacts i-th component of social spending for the coefficient of the speed of adjustment, 
these areas. The work of Bello and Ruiz del domestic product in the period “t” When the coefficient () is statistically 
 
unity. This indicates dynamic stability, 
•  
term relationship between social spending term output elasticity of the corresponding 
of countries in the region. Much literature health-care and education spending were between the variables. For all the countries,
aggregate public spending and GDP both them simultaneously, and in all eight both a long-term relationship with GDP. For 
perspective, and the main conclusion has were procyclical. Housing expenditure was Chile, Colombia, Panama and Uruguay, 
to the situation case in the countries of the all areas of spending were procyclical; in spending, whereas for the Dominican 
and Development (OECD). Chile and Ecuador, however, public spending term relationship exists for only one 
various items of fiscal spending, this work To determine whether shor t-term (2) must be used instead of (1) in order 
1980-2006, for various  components of of  by failing to consider a  
probable 
term elasticity. 
spending, valued in dollars at 2000 prices, the authors made a new estimate based is education spending, elasticities are 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, The new estimated equation is: occurs in cases where the dependent 
(2)  log (SSit) = + *  log(GDPt) + Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru This implies that in the long  term,
The main findings are derived from than GDP. 
the following equation:a 
(1)   log (SSit) =  +  *  log 


represents the speed of adjustment
 not statistically different from 
zero for any
 
 is the long-term elasticity of the indicates that social spending behaves 
 
Box I.1 
SOCIAL SPENDING AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN LATIN AMERICA 
Public spending on education, health care,  Where: SSit  : level of spending of the  The main results for the estimated 
in Latin America, especially owing to the lacks period “t” long-term elasticity and short-term elasticity 
of a significant proportion of the population in GDPt   : level of the country’s gross are as follows: 
Castillo (2010) looks at the short- and long-  The estimated coefficient, , is the short-  significant, it is negative and less than 
and levels of economic activity for a number spending component. The results show that  so that there is a long-term relationship 
has looked at the relationship between procyclical for eight countries, in seven of  at least one of the types of spending has 
over the business cycle and from a trend social spending and total public spending  the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
been that fiscal policy is procyclical, contrary procyclical in five countries. In Argentina,  GDP is cointegrated with five types of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation Colombia and Mexico five areas were. In  Republic, Ecuador and Peru that long- 
To estimate the output elasticity of was acyclical. expenditure item. In these cases, equation 
 
uses annual frequency series for the period analysis produces a biased  estimate  to obtain a proper specification of short- 
GDP, public spending, and public social long-term relationship between the variables, •   In equations whose dependent variable 
for 11 Latin American countries: Argentina, on the conditional error correction model.  greater than unity. Something similar 
Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,   variable is health-care  spending. 
and Uruguay. * log (SSit) – * log (GDPt) + t these items of spending grow faster 
two estimates, the first of which arises from 
Where: is equal to *, •    Lastly, in the case of Chile, elasticities are 
 
of elasticity at its long-term value of the social spending variables, which 
(GDPt) + t expenditure component acyclically.  
Source: Omar Bello and Ramiro Ruiz del Castillo, “Gasto social en América Latina: relación con el ciclo y opciones para reducir la volatilidad económica”, document presented 
in the workshop on distributive impact in public policies, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 28- 29 April 2010. 
a     The Phillips and Perron unit root test was performed for the variables expressed in logarithms. All the variables but one (the health-spending logarithm for Peru) were 
found to be integrated of order one. 
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3. The distributive impact of public policy 
and financing
The levels of inequality found in the countries of the Latin 
American and Caribbean region make State action through 
distributive policies especially important. Public provision of 
goods and services can change income distribution through pro-
grammes whose beneficiaries do not bear the burden of financ-
ing (or bear it only in part) and whose impact depends on the 
level and quality of social spending. But in societies as unequal 
as those of Latin America, redistributive policy based on public 
spending is not enough. It is important to examine how this 
provision is financed and how tax systems work to achieve more 
equitable income distribution. Not only must a certain amount 
of resources be generated to finance public spending (especially 
social spending). It is also necessary to consider which segments 
of the population are providing those funds.
Terms such as “equitable distribution of income”, “equal
opportunities” and “universal entitlement to economic, 
social and cultural rights” have long —and legitimately— 
been expressions that shape public and fiscal policy dis-
course (Basombrío, 2009). But the quest for greater equity 
is not without ambiguity. As seen in ECLAC (2010b), 
equity and equality are multi-dimensional, value-laden 
concepts. Examining their reach can provide an under-
standing of how they are related to fiscal policy.
Implementing the principle of equity in public sector 
actions poses special difficulties because of the need to 
provide conceptual content for the notions of equal and 
unequal treatment and circumstances and to assess how 
much the fiscal system is expected to contribute to the 
attainment of certain redistributive goals. Beyond con-
ceptual debates, though, what is needed is a pragmatic, 
operative position in the quest for a more just society that 
will address the most glaring, troublesome inequalities. 
 The principle of tax equity is rooted in two basic ideas 
employed to justify the collection and distribution of taxes. 
One is benefit, which concerns the need to establish taxes 
on the basis of the benefits that individuals receive from 
the State. The other is payment capacity, which focuses 
on the economic capacity of taxpayers and can be used to 
justify applying progressive criteria (J.P. Jiménez and Ruiz-
Huerta, 2009). Equitable distribution of the tax burden 
among the members of society requires weighing the 
different circumstances of each taxpayer and gives rise to 
the criteria of horizontal equity (equal treatment for those 
in equal circumstances) and vertical equity (appropriately 
unequal treatment for those in differing circumstances). 
 This chapter focuses on three elements that are essen-
tial to developing a tax policy that improves equity in the 
countries of Latin America: level of revenue, tax struc-
ture and degree of compliance. Unfortunately, the vast 
majority of countries in the region suffer from significant 
weaknesses in each of these key areas. The tax burden is 
low, the tax structure is biased towards regressive taxes 
and there are significant levels of non-compliance (J.P. 
Jiménez, Gómez Sabaini and Podestá, 2010).
 In taxation, there are no absolute rules for achieving 
greater equity, and some criteria are ambiguous in that 
they can work both for and against equity in tax systems 
at the same time. So, as noted by Musgrave and Musgrave 
(1992), “Tax policy is an art no less than a science; and 
equity is to be sought as a matter of degree rather than as 
an absolute norm”.
3.1. Taxation as a distributive policy tool
The ability of fiscal policy to modify the distribution of
income determined by market forces has changed over 
time and differs markedly among regions. Studies have 
shown that the levels of inequality prior to State interven-
tion in countries of Latin America are similar to those 
in other, more developed countries and that inequality 
is often greater in the latter (Barreix, Roca and Villela, 
2006; Gómez Sabaini, 2006).
 But, as emerges from a study by Chu, Davoodi and 
Gupta (2000), while taxes and spending effectively im-
prove distribution in the industrialized countries, devel-
oping countries lack appropriate distributive policies for 
attaining a comparable degree of equality. Indeed, studies 
available in Latin America and the Caribbean show that 
the tax system usually has a regressive effect and that 
spending programmes only partially offset tax regressive-
ness. There are even cases in which taxes and transfers not 
only do not correct inequality —they exacerbate it.
 There are two ways in which tax policy can influence 
a country’s income distribution structure. First, it can cap-
ture resources to finance public spending aimed at creat-
ing and strengthening human capital through health care, 
education and sanitation programmes, among others. Tax 
policy thus becomes a factor that contributes to the for-
mation of human capital. By improving market income, 
it improves “primary distribution”, that is, the distribu-
tion of income before resources are taxed and transferred. 
Second, tax policy can act on the income distribution 
structure through progressive taxes geared to modify 
“secondary distribution”, i.e., the distribution of income 
after taxes. Income and property taxes, among others, play 
a key role in this regard (Gómez Sabaini, 2006). 
their objective if evasion significantly reduces revenue. 
As for tax rates, he notes the dichotomy surrounding 
corporate income tax in most Latin American countries: 
though nominal tax rates are high (28% on average in 
2006), effective rates are significantly lower, due to a vari-
ety of tax benefits. Thus, fewer resources are available for 
progressive social spending; horizontal inequity increases, 
and opportunities for evasion and avoidance multiply.
1. Level of revenue
Several studies have shown that the region’s potential level 
of tax revenue is significantly higher than its effective 
level (Perry et al., 2006; Agosin, Barreix and Machado, 
2005). There is thus room for improving the redistribu-
tive capacity of the State by providing more revenue. 
However, as noted by Musgrave and Musgrave, (1992), 
“a high, moderately progressive tax burden can have a 
greater impact on the distribution of income than a low, 
strongly progressive one”.
 Differences between the countries of the region 
notwithstanding, their tax burden is generally low, both 
compared with countries in other regions and relative to 
their own level of development. More developed countries 
generally have a larger public sector and thus a higher tax 
burden. Figure 16 compares 121 countries, using a cross-
section regression analysis that focuses on the relationship 
between tax burden and the per-capita GDP logarithm.22
 Only four of the nineteen Latin American countries 
studied are above the regression line. The tax burden in 
Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia may be described as high in comparison with 
their per-capita GDP. Costa Rica and Uruguay are very 
close to the regression line, that is, their tax burden would 
appear to be adequate in relation to their level of develop-
ment. The tax burden of the remaining 13 countries is 
clearly lower than it should be according to their level of 
development.
 This simple exercise shows that most of the countries 
could increase their tax burden. In aggregate terms, given 
the level of economic development of the region, the tax 
burden could be increased by an average of three points
of GDP. However, excluding the four countries whose ef-
fective tax burden exceeds the potential tax burden brings 
the average up to five points of GDP. 
22 It should be noted that this simple exercise is not intended as an analysis of the factors 
that determine the tax burden in each country. In order to develop such a model, other 
important variables would have to be examined.
 The three main factors that limit the redistributive 
role of the State in Latin America are a low tax burden, 
regressive taxation and poorly targeted public spending 
(Goñi, López and Servén, 2008). There is disagreement, 
however, as to whether these factors should be modified. 
There is broad consensus regarding the need to step up 
efforts to ensure greater progressivity in public spending.
As for the need to increase the tax burden, however, 
agreement is substantial but more limited. Support for 
more progressive reforms is weaker.
 Experts clearly disagree on taxation’s potential as a 
redistributive tool. Nevertheless, the persistence of this 
regressive tax structure over the years reveals that the 
dominant view —at least among those experts in a posi-
tion to influence tax policy— is that redistribution can be 
achieved most effectively through social spending, while 
tax policy should focus on efficiency (Jorratt, 2009).
 The magnitude of inequality in Latin America and 
the Caribbean is such that the potential of taxation as 
a redistributive tool should not be ignored. It is thus 
useful to examine why income tax collection levels are 
so low in the region. Among the main reasons are low 
legal rates (and even lower effective rates) and narrow 
tax bases. These and other particularities are related to 
high tax evasion, as do the tax privileges and loopholes 
that characterize tax systems in the region. In such an 
environment, the basic prerequisites of equity —namely, 
that those with the same payment capacity pay the same 
(horizontal equity) and those with greater payment 
capacity pay more (vertical equity)— go unfulfilled.
 Equity, both horizontal and vertical, faces significant 
practical challenges in the countries of Latin America. 
This compromises the legitimacy of the region’s tax 
systems and ultimately affects their ability to collect 
revenue. Thus, the countries of the region find themselves 
trapped in a vicious circle of regressive taxation and scant 
resources, unequal distribution of income and delegiti-
mization of public institutions and of the role of the State 
(Gómez Sabaini and O’Farrell, 2009).
 Direct taxation must therefore be strengthened, and 
the balance between direct and indirect taxation must 
be improved. As noted by Jorratt (2009) in his study of 
taxation in Chile, if the redistributive impact of the tax 
system is to be increased, income and property taxes 
must be redesigned to ensure that they account for a 
greater share of overall revenue. They must also be made 
more progressive. He also points out that curbing tax 
evasion and avoidance is essential, as these practices are 
among the chief causes of inequity. 
 Along the same lines, Roca (2009) points out that, 
while personal income taxes may be designed to produce 
a given redistributive effect, they will not actually achieve 
20 |
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 The average gap between potential and effective tax 
burden hides significant differences between countries. The 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Panama could increase their tax burden to 
make it more consistent with their GDP per capita. With the 
exception of Guatemala, these countries generate significant 
revenues from non-tax sources (oil or the Panama Canal, for 
example) that partially offset their low tax collections. 
 Another simple way of demonstrating the low tax 
burden in Latin America is to compare it with tax burdens 
in other regions around the world. Figure 17 shows that the 
average tax burden of Latin American countries is virtually 
half that of the member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
 However, the graph also clearly shows that the 
region’s low tax burden is primarily a result of low direct 
tax collection (income and property taxes) in terms of 
GDP. On average, the direct tax burden in developed 
countries is ten GDP points above that of Latin America. 
Moreover, revenue from income and property taxes (in 
relation to GDP) in Latin America is the lowest in the 
world. Even African countries generate higher revenues 
from such taxes, on average, than do Latin American 
countries.
 Another significant difference in relation to devel-
oped countries lies in lower social security revenues, while 
taxes on goods and services in Latin America are compa-
rable to those in OECD countries.
 As mentioned earlier, one way of improving the 
distribution of income is through the level of tax revenues 
that can be earmarked to finance social spending. It is 
telling that the three countries with the highest tax rev-
enues (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) are also those with 
the highest level of social spending (J.P. Jiménez, Gómez 
Sabaini and Podestá, 2010). 
 However, the tax burden is not the only factor that 
influences the distribution of income in a country. The 
composition of the tax burden is also important. In other 
words, it is not simply a question of how much revenue 
is collected, but also how it is collected. This issue is dis-
cussed in the following subsection. 
2. Tax structure
The second factor to be examined is the origin of tax
revenues, bearing in mind the criteria of equity. Studies 
by Perry et al. (2006), Agosin et al. (2004) and Gómez 
Sabaini (2006) have noted that the main cause of the gap 
between potential and effective revenue is a shortfall in 
direct taxation —more specifically, personal income tax. 
Virtually no such gap exists with regard to consumption 
taxes in most of the countries in the region. 
 Figure 18 illustrates the evolution of the region’s aver-
age tax structure, which is characterized by the following:
•  Declining international trade taxes as a percentage of 
total revenue. This change was brought about by the 
creation of economic unions (free trade zones, MER-
COSUR), falling nominal import tariffs and the lift-
ing of export taxes (Argentina is the most noteworthy 
exception to this latter trend).
•  Sustained growth in value-added taxes (VAT) through-
out the region. Brazil adopted this tax in 1967 and 
Argentina and Ecuador implemented it in the 1970s, 
but not until more recently did it expand throughout 
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be redesigned to ensure that they account for a greater 
share of overall revenue. They must also be made more 
progressive. He also points out that curbing tax evasion 
and avoidance is essential, as these practices are among 
the chief causes of inequity. 
Along the same lines, Roca (2009) points out that, 
while personal income taxes may be designed to produce 
a given redistributive effect, they will not actually achieve 
their objective if evasion significantly reduces revenue. As 
for tax rates, he notes the dichotomy surrounding corporate 
income tax in most Latin American countries: though 
nominal tax rates are high (28% on average in 2006), 
effective rates are significantly lower, due to a variety 
of tax benefits. Thus, fewer resources are available for 
progressive social spending; horizontal inequity increases, 
and opportunities for evasion and avoidance multiply. 
1. Level of revenue 
Several studies have shown that the region’s potential 
level of tax revenue is significantly higher than its 
effective level (Perry et al., 2006; Agosin, Barreix and 
Machado, 2005). There is thus room for improving the 
redistributive capacity of the State by providing more 
revenue. However, as noted by Musgrave and Musgrave, 
(1992), “a high, moderately progressive tax burden can 
have a greater impact on the distribution of income than 
a low, strongly progressive one”. 
Differences between the countries of the region 
notwithstanding, their tax burden is generally low, both 
compared with countries in other regions and relative 
to their own level of development. More developed 
countries generally have a larger public sector and thus 
a higher tax burden. Figure II.1 compares 121 countries, 
using a cross-section regression analysis that focuses on 
the relationship between tax burden and the per-capita 
GDP logarithm.1 
Only four of the nineteen Latin American countries 
studied are above the regression line. The tax burden in 
Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia may be described as high in comparison with 
their per-capita GDP. Costa Rica and Uruguay are very 
close to the regression line, that is, their tax burden 
would appear to be adequate in relation to their level of 
development. The tax burden of the remaining 13 countries 
is clearly lower than it should be according to their level 
of development. 
This simple exercise shows that most of the countries 
could increase their tax burden. In aggregate terms, given 
the level of economic development of the region, the tax 
burden could be increased by an average of three points 
of GDP. However, excluding the four countries whose 
effective tax burden exceeds the potential tax burden 
brings the average up to five points of GDP. 
Figure 
COMPARISON OF TAX BURDEN AND PER CAPITA GDP 
IN PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
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parity 
Source: J.C. Gómez Sabaini, J.P. Jiménez and A. Podestá, “Tributación, evasión y 
equidad en América Latina”, Evasión y equidad en América Latina, Project 
document No. 309  (LC/W.309), J.C. Gómez Sabaini, J.P. Jiménez
and A. Podestá (comps.), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2010. 
The average gap between potential and effective tax 
burden hides significant differences between countries. The 
livarian Republic of V nezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
ico and Panama could incr as  their tax burden to 
 it ore con istent with their GDP per capita. With 
the exception of Guatemala, these countries generate 
significant revenues from non-tax sources (oil or the 
Panama Canal, for example) that partially offset their 
low tax collections. 
1 It should be noted that this simple exercise is not intended as an 
analysis of the factors that determine the tax burden in each country.
In order to develop such a model, other important variables would 
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Another simple way of demonstrating the low tax 
burden in Latin America is to compare it with tax burdens 
in other regions around the world. Figure II.2 shows that the 
average tax burden of Latin American countries is virtually 
half that of the member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
However, the graph also clearly shows that the region’s
low tax burden is primarily a result of low direct tax 
collection (income and property taxes) in terms of GDP. 
On average, the direct tax burden in developed countries 
is ten GDP points above that of Latin America. Moreover, 
revenue from income and property taxes (in relation to 
GDP) in Latin America is the lowest in the world. Even 
Africa  c untr es gen rate higher revenues f om such 
tax s, on verage, than do Latin Am ican countri s. 
Another significant difference in relation to
developed countries lies in lower social security revenues,
while taxes on goods and services in Latin America are 
comparable to those in OECD countries. 
As mentioned earlier, one way of improving the 
distribution of income is through the level of tax revenues 
that can be earmarked to finance social spending. It is 
telling that the three countries with the highest tax revenues 
(Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) are also those with the 
highest level of social spending (J.P. Jiménez, Gómez 
Sabaini and Podestá, 2010). 
However, e tax burden is not the only factor that 
infl ences the distribution of income in a country. The 
composition of the tax burden is also important. In other 
words, it is not simply a question of how much revenue 
is collected, but also how it is collected. This issue is 
discussed in the following subsection. 
Figure 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE LEVEL AND 
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Direct tax burden Indirect tax burden Social security burden 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Note:     The average for Latin America refers to the central government, except for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
where it refers to the general government. 
2. Tax structure 
The second factor to be examined is the origin of tax 
revenues, bearing in mind the criteria of equity. Studies 
by Perry et al. (2006), Agosin et al. (2004) and Gómez 
Sabaini (2006) have noted that the main cause of the gap 
between potential and effective revenue is a shortfall in 
direct taxation —more specifically, personal income tax. 
Virtually no such gap exists with regard to consumption 
taxes in most of the countries in the region. 
Figure II.3 illustrates the evolution of the region’s 
average tax structure, which is characterized by the 
following: 
•  Declining international trade taxes as a percentage 
of total revenue. This change was brought about by 
the creation of economic unions (free trade zones, 
MERCOSUR), falling nominal import tariffs and 
the lifting of export taxes (Argentina is the most 
noteworthy exception to this latter trend). 
•  Sustained growth in value-added taxes (VAT) throughout 
the region. Brazil adopted this tax in 1967 and Argentina 
and Ecuador implemented it in the 1970s, but not until 
more recently did it expand throughout the region and 
become a strategically important source of revenue. 
•  Significant growth in income tax revenues. However, 
income tax focuses on corporations, and this growth 
is associated with an increase in revenue from mining 
and oil companies. The greater potential for transferring 
makes the distributive impact of corporate income 
tax lower than with personal income tax. 
•  Personal income tax is essentially a tax on income 
from formal waged employment. 
•  Significant decrease in the number of taxes applied, 
especially selective taxes that now fall only on goods 
and services with a relatively inelastic demand (such 
as tobacco, alcoholic beverages and fuel). 
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 Income tax revenue grew by more than 70% across 
the region between 1990 and 2008, rising from 2.8 to 4.8 
points of GDP, on average, during that period. As men-
tioned above, however, this figure is very low by interna-
tional standards and is not enough to improve income 
distribution in the region.
 The low relative importance of income taxes is ap-
parent in almost every country in the region. Only the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Peru 
succeeded in generating income tax revenue equivalent to 
6 to 8 points of GDP in 2008. Income tax revenue in Ar-
gentina, Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua is also above 
the regional average, hovering at approximately
5% of GDP. As explained earlier, income tax revenue is 
primarily from income earned by corporations engaged 
in productive activities related to the exploitation of non- 
renewable natural resources.
 
 As shown in table II.1, Latin America is close to the
average for developed countries in terms of corporate 
income tax (3.4 versus 3.9 points of GDP, respectively). 
With regard to personal income tax, however, it lags 
far behind OECD countries. Latin American countries 
generate only 1.5% of GDP, on average, from personal 
income taxes (even in Brazil, the country with the highest 
percentage, it is only 2.6 percentage points), compared 
with OECD economies, where it is more than 9 percent-
age points of GDP. Moreover, most personal income 
tax revenue in the region is obtained from wage earners, 
mainly because self-employed persons have greater access 
to evasion and avoidance strategies and because of the 
preferential tax treatment accorded to capital income in 
most countries.  
 The structure in Latin American countries is there-
fore the inverse of the structure in OECD countries. In 
the former, corporate income tax collections account for 
 the region and become a strategically important source 
of revenue.
•  Significant growth in income tax revenues. However, 
income tax focuses on corporations, and this growth 
is associated with an increase in revenue from mining 
and oil companies. The greater potential for transfer-
ring makes the distributive impact of corporate income 
tax lower than with personal income tax.
•  Personal income tax is essentially a tax on income from 
formal waged employment.
•  Significant decrease in the number of taxes applied, 
especially selective taxes that now fall only on goods 
and services with a relatively inelastic demand (such as 
tobacco, alcoholic beverages and fuel).
•  Appearance of extraordinary tax schemes applying to, 
for example, bank withdrawals and deposits, financial 
transaction taxes and the like.
•  Unresolved issues, both in designing regulations and 
in administering the tax system, caused by growing 
market informality during the 1990s, especially in the 
labour market and in self-generated employment.
•  Low, stagnant property taxes despite the existence 
of a wide variety of taxes that target property in some 
way.23 One of the unresolved challenges in the region 
has to do with strengthening such taxes, mainly at the 
subnational government level. Improving cadastral 
records is essential for ensuring property tax equity and 
efficiency.
23 See the detailed study of property taxes in Latin America, in De Cesare and Lazo Marín 
(2008).
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•  Appearance of extraordinary tax schemes applying 
to, for example, bank withdrawals and deposits, 
financial transaction taxes and the like. 
•  Unresolved issues, both in designing regulations and 
in administering the tax system, caused by growing 
market informality during the 1990s, especially in the 
labour market and in self-generated employment. 
•  Low, stagnant property taxes despite the existence of a 
wide variety of taxes that target property in som  way.2 
One of the unresolved challenges in the region h s o do 
with stren theni g such taxes, ainly at the subn tional 
government level. Improving cadastral records is
essential for ensuring property tax equity and
efficiency. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA: CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
(Percentage of GDP) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note:     “Non-classifiable” corresponds to data where official figures are not broken 
down between individuals and companies. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SIMPLE AVERAGE): 
TAX STRUCTURE, 1990-2008 
(Percentage of GDP) 
As shown in table II.1, Latin America is close to the 
average for developed countries in terms of corporate 
income tax (3.4 versus 3.9 points of GDP, respectively). 
With regard to personal income tax, however, it lags 
far behind OECD countries. Latin Ameri an countries 
generate only 1.5% of GDP, on average, from personal 
incom  taxes ( ven in Brazil, the country with the 
highest percentage, it is only 2.6 percentage points), 
compared with OECD economies, where it is more than 
9 percentage points of GDP. Moreover, most personal 
income tax revenue in the region is obtained from wage 
earners, mainly because self-employed persons have 
greater access to evasion and avoidance strategies and 
because of the preferential tax treatment accorded to 
capital income in most countries. 
The structure in Latin American countries is therefore 
the inverse of the structure in OECD countries. In the 
former, corpora e income tax collec ions account for 70%
—the same percentage that in OECD countries is from 
individual income tax.3 
In short, the structure of the region’s tax systems is 
one of the factors behind the region’s on-going disparities 
in income distribution. Reforms in this area must therefore 
focus on increasing the impact of tax policy on income 
distribution, raising the tax burden on wealthier sectors of 
society. This can be accomplished, for example, through 
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Other taxes 
Property 
Goods and services (specific) 
Social security 
Other direct taxes 
International trade and transactions 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Income tax revenue grew by more than 70% across 
the region between 1990 and 2008, rising from 2.8 to 
4.8 points of GDP, on average, during that period. As 
mentioned above, however, this figure is very low by 
international standards and is not enough to improve 
income distribution in the region. 
The low relative importance of income taxes is 
apparent in almost every country in the region. Only the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Peru 
succeeded in generating income tax revenue equivalent 
to 6 to 8 points of GDP in 2008. Income tax revenue 
in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua is also 
above the regional average, hovering at approximately 
5% of GDP. As explained earlier, income tax revenue is 
primarily from income earned by corporations engaged 
in productive activities related to the exploitation of non-
renewable natural resources. 
3 According to Cetrángolo and Gómez Sabaini (2007), two factors 
explain why families or individuals account for a larger share of 
income tax revenue in developed countries than do corporations. 
First, the tax authorities of those countries have a greater capacity 
to track large numbers of taxpayers. Second, per capita (or family)
income in developed countries is higher, making a larger
percentage of the population  subject to income tax. In Latin
America, on the other hand, a large portion of the population 
falls below the minimum tax threshold. 
2 See the detailed study of property taxes in Latin America, in De 
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•  Appearance of extraordinary tax schemes applying 
to, for example, ank withdrawals and deposits, 
financial transaction taxes and the like. 
•  Unresolved issues, both in designing regulations and 
in administering the tax system, caused b  growing 
market informality during the 1990s, especially in the 
labour market and in self-generated employment. 
•  L w, stagnant property taxes despit  the existence of a 
wide v riety of tax s hat target perty in some way.2 
One of the unresolved challenges in the region has to o 
with strengthening such taxes, mainly at the s bnatio al 
government level. Improving cadastral records is
essential for ensuring property tax equity and
efficiency. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA: CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
(Percentage of GDP) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Note:     “Non-classifiable” corresponds to data where official figures are not broken 
down between individuals and companies. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SIMPLE AVERAGE): 
TAX STRUCTURE, 1990-2008 
(Percentage of GDP) 
As shown in table II.1, Latin America is close to the 
average for developed countries in terms of corporate 
income tax (3.4 versus 3.9 points of GDP, respectively). 
With regard to personal inc me tax, however, it lags 
far behind OECD countries. Latin Am rican countries 
gen rate only 1.5% of GDP, on average, from pe sonal 
incom  taxes (even in Brazil, the country with the 
highest percentage, it is only 2.6 percentage points), 
compared with OECD economies, where it is more than 
9 percentage points of GDP. More ver, most personal 
income tax revenue in the region is obtained from wage 
earners, mainly because self-employed persons have 
greater access to evasion and avoidance strategies and 
because of the prefere tial tax treatment accorded to 
capital income in most countries. 
The structure in Latin American countries is therefore 
the inverse of the structure in OECD countries. In the 
former, corporat  i come tax collections account for 70%
—the sam  percentage that in OECD countries is from 
individual income tax.3 
In short, the structure of the region’s tax systems is 
ne of the factors behind the region’s on-going disparities 
in income distribution. Reforms i  this area must therefore 
focus on increasing the impact of tax policy on income 
distribution, raising the tax burden on wealthier sectors of 
society. This can be accomplished, for example, through 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Income tax revenue grew by more than 70% across 
the region between 1990 and 2008, rising from 2.8 to 
4.8 points of GDP, on average, during t at period. As 
mentioned a ove, however, this figure is very low by 
international standards and is not enough to improve 
income distribution in the region. 
The low relative importance of income taxes is 
apparent in almost every country in the region. Only the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile and Peru 
succeeded in generating income tax revenue equivalent 
to 6 to 8 points of GDP in 2008. Income ta  revenue 
in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Nicaragua is also 
above the regional average, hovering at approximately 
5% of GDP. As explained earlier, income tax revenue is 
primarily from income earned by corporations engaged 
in productive activities related to the exploitation of non-
renewable n tural res urces. 
3 According to Cetrángolo and Gómez Sabaini (2007), two factors 
explain why families or individuals account for a larger share of 
income tax revenue in developed countries than do corporations. 
First, the tax authorities of those countries have a greater capacity 
to track large numbers of taxpayers. Second, per capita (or family)
income in developed countries is higher, making a larger
percentage of the population  subject to income tax. In Latin
America, on the other hand, a large portion of the population 
falls below the minimum tax threshold. 
2 See the detailed study of property taxes in Latin America, in De 
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70% —the same percentage that in OECD countries is 
from individual income tax.24 
 In short, the structure of the region’s tax systems is 
one of the factors behind the region’s on-going dispari-
ties in income distribution. Reforms in this area must 
therefore focus on increasing the impact of tax policy on 
income distribution, raising the tax burden on wealthier 
sectors of society. This can be accomplished, for example, 
through personal income taxes.
24 According to Cetrángolo and Gómez Sabaini (2007), two factors explain why families 
or individuals account for a larger share of income tax revenue in developed countries 
than do corporations. First, the tax authorities of those countries have a greater capacity 
to track large numbers of taxpayers. Second, per capita (or family) income in developed 
countries is higher, making a larger percentage of the population  subject to income tax. 
In Latin America, on the other hand, a large portion of the population falls below the 
minimum tax threshold.
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Table II.1 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE INCOME TAX COLLECTIONS 




consumption Country Companies Individuals Total 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Roca, “Tributación directa en Ecuador. Evasión, equidad y desafíos de diseño”, 
Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 85 (LC/L.3057-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009. United Nations
publication, Sales No. S.09.II.G.55 for Ecuador; M. Cabrera, “La tributación directa en América Latina, equidad y desafíos: el caso de El Salvador”, Macroeconomía del 
desarrollo series, No. 87 (LC/L.3066-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. S.09.II.G.60, for El Salvador and Guatemala; D. Álvarez Estrada, “Tributación directa en América Latina, equidad y desafíos. Estudio del caso de México”, Macroeconomía
del desarrollo series, No. 91 (LC/L.3093-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009. United Nations publication, 
Sales No. S.09.II.G.77, for Mexico; and O. Cetrángolo and J.C. Gómez Sabaini “La tributación directa en América Latina y los desafíos a la imposición sobre la renta”, 
Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 60 (LC/L.2838-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.159 for Honduras, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic. 
3. Degree of compliance 
Tax compliance is the third factor to bear in mind when 
examining the distributive impact of tax policy. Without 
low delinquency and evasion levels, neither the level 
of revenue nor the tax structure is sustainable. Curbing 
evasion generates greater resources for social spending. 
And, as explained above, it is crucial in developing an 
equitable and pr gressive t x structure. 
Available estimates show that individual and corporate 
income tax eva ion is far deepe than VAT evasio  d s ite 
the very close relationship between the two taxes (see 
table II.2).4  In recent years, the tax authorities seem to 
have focused much more on fighting VAT evasion than 
on evasion related to direct taxes. 
ECLAC studies estimate income tax non-compliance 
at a very high 40% to 65%. This represents an average gap 
of 4.6% of GDP. Such high levels of non-compliance work 
against the redistributive impact of income tax. Evasion 
jeopardizes horizontal equity, since evaders pay fewer 
taxes than taxpayers with the same payment capacity. 
It also reduces vertical equity, since the incentive to 
evade becomes stronger as tax rates increase. Moreover, 
wealthier individuals have greater access to professional 
advice, which often includes tax avoidance strategies or 
reduces the risks of non-compliance. Curbing tax evasion 
and avoidance is therefore essential for improving the 
distributive impact of tax systems. 
4 This is why the studies compiled by J.P. Jiménez, Gómez Sabaini 
and Podestá (2010) make a significant effort to estimate the level 
of income tax non-compliance in seven Latin American countries. 
Direct taxation has also been thoroughly analyzed, and the main 
issues that affect distributive equity have been identified. 
   
Argentina (2007) 3.6 1.6 5.4 2.3 0.4 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) (2007) 3.0 0.2 3.3 14.4 0.3 
Brazil (2007) 5.1 2.6 7.7 2.0 0.5 
Chile (2007) 7.3 1.2 8.4 6.3 0.9 
Dominican Republic (2002) 1.3 1.8 3.1 0.7 0.4 
Ecuador (2006) 2.3 0.8 3.1 3.1 0.5 
El Salvador (2007) 2.7 1.9 4.6 1.4 0.6 
Guatemala (2007) 2.9 0.3 3.4 8.5 0.5 
Honduras (2004) 3.7 1.6 5.3 2.3 0.5 
Haiti (2006) 1.0 1.1 2.1 0.9 0.6 
Mexico (2005) 2.4 2.2 4.6 1.1 1.2 
Nicaragua (2001) 3.1 2.0 5.1 1.6 0.5 
Panama (2006) 2.9 2.0 5.0 1.5 1.8 
Peru(2007) 5.9 1.4 7.2 4.2 1.0 
Latin America (14) 3.4 1.5 4.9 2.3 0.7 
OECD (2006) 3.9 9.2 13.0 0.4 1.2 
United States (2006) 3.3 10.2 13.5 0.3 2.9 
 
 ECLAC studies estimate income tax non-compliance 
at a very high 40% to 65%. This represents an average 
gap of 4.6% of GDP. Such high levels of non-compliance 
work against the redistributive impact of income tax. 
Evasion jeopardizes horizontal equity, since evaders pay 
fewer taxes than taxpayers with the same payment capac-
ity. It also reduces vertical equity, since the incentive to 
evade becomes stronger as tax rates increase. Moreover, 
wealthier individuals have greater access to professional 
advice, which often includes tax avoidance strategies or 
reduces the risks of non-compliance. Curbing tax evasion 
and avoidance is therefore essential for improving the 
distributive impact of tax systems.
 
3. Degree of compliance
Tax compliance is the third factor to bear in mind when 
examining the distributive impact of tax policy. Without 
low delinquency and evasion levels, neither the level of 
revenue nor the tax structure is sustainable. Curbing eva-
sion generates greater resources for social spending. And, 
as explained above, it is crucial in developing an equitable 
and progressive tax structure.
 Available estimates show that individual and corpo-
rate income tax evasion is far deeper than VAT evasion 
despite the very close relationship between the two taxes 
(see table II.2).25 In recent years, the tax authorities seem 
to have focused much more on fighting VAT evasion than 
on evasion related to direct taxes.
25 This is why the studies compiled by J.P. Jiménez, Gómez Sabaini and Podestá (2010) 
make a significant effort to estimate the level of income tax non-compliance in seven 
Latin American countries. Direct taxation has also been thoroughly analyzed, and the 
main issues that affect distributive equity have been identified..
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Table II.2 
LATIN AMERICA: VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) AND INCOME TAX NON-COMPLIANCE RATES 
(Percentages) 
Gap Estimate year Gap Estimate year 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of O. Cetrángolo and J.C. Gómez Sabaini “La tributación directa en América Latina y 
los desafíos a la imposición sobre la renta”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 60 (LC/L.2838-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.159; M. Jorratt De Luis, “La tributación directa en Chile: equidad y desafíos”,
Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 92 (LC/L.3094-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009. United Nations 
publication, Sales No. S.09.II.G.78; J. Roca, “Tributación directa en Ecuador. Evasión, equidad y desafíos de diseño”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 85 (LC/L.3057-
P), Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2009. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.09.II.G.55; M. Cabrera and V.
Guzmán, “La tributación directa en América Latina, equidad y desafíos: El caso de El Salvador”, Macroeconomía del desarrollo series, No. 87 (LC/L.3066-P), Santiago,
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Box II.1 
EQUITY IN VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) AND IN INCOME TAX 
 
Tax design is the most direct way in which of the reforms were then compared with Regarding VAT, the noteworthy outcomes 
tax policy affects the distribution of income. those of the system in place. were: 
Each tax can be progressive, proportional  The VAT reforms considered were: •     VAT is vertically regressive in the three 
or regressive. Combined, they can have an •     Repeal exemptions, except those that  countries, but transferring revenue to 
aggregate redistributive effect.The two basic  apply to financial services;  the three poorest deciles improves 
principles of tax equity are vertical equity (an •     Transfer the increased revenue from  income distribution compared with the 
individual with a higher tax payment capacity  non-exempt VAT to the three poorest  current situation; 
should pay proportionally more taxes than  deciles. •     Horizontal equity remained at similar 
one with a lower payment capacity), and  The simulated income tax reforms were:  levels in Ecuador and Guatemala and 
horizontal equity (individuals with similar tax •     Keep the existing income tax, but repeal  decreased somewhat in Paraguay; 
payment capacities should be taxed similarly).  the tax expenditures; •     Broadening the tax base by eliminating 
The study discussed in this box assesses the •     Flat income tax: Replace the personal  exemptions increased both vertical and 
vertical and horizontal equity of the two main  income tax rate scale with a scale that  horizontal inequity. 
taxes that affect households —value-added has two brackets (one that is exempt and  Some of the key outcomes regarding 
tax (VAT) and income tax— in three countries: one that is subject to a single marginal income tax were: 
Ecuador, Guatemala and Paraguay.  rate). The corporate income tax rate is •     Income tax is progressive in the three 
The methodology  used  involves also changed. The rate and the exempt countries and has a high degree 
comparing the distribution of household  bracket are chosen in order to match  of horizontal inequity, especially in 
income before and after taxes. The unit of revenue in exercise (a); Guatemala and Paraguay; 
analysis is the household; family income is •     Dual i come tax: keep the existing rate •     Broadening the base (repealing tax 
the variable chosen as th  indicator of well-  scale for income from waged work,  expenditures) and redistributing the 
being. Equivalence-scale-adjusted per-capita  with a single rate for capital income  increased revenue would bring the Gini 
income is used to compare households with  and own-account work. Adjust the flat  coefficient down by a range of 0.03 points 
different numbers of members. Equivalent  rate to obtain the same revenue as in  (Ecuador) to 0.06 points (Guatemala); 
income, Ye, is thus defined as   the first exercise; •     The family income tax is the one that 
Ye = Y / na; •     Family income tax: the unit of taxation achieves the greatest redistributive impact 
where Y: nominal household income;  is not the individual but the household. in all three countries, as well as the best 
n: number of household members; Maintain the existing rate structure; horizontal equity performance; 
a: factor reflecting household economies  the basis of assessment is equivalent •     Repealing tax expenditures is more 
of scale (given the existence of semi-fixed  income Ye;  progressive than the flat- and dual-rate 
costs). •     These four reforms were then evaluated,  alternatives. But the loss of progressivity 
To determine the feasibility of improving assuming that the increased revenue is with the latter two options is not of a 
tax system progressivity and horizontal  transferred to the three poorest deciles. magnitude such that would bar considering 
equity, selected equity indicators were  These exercises yielded interesting them on the basis of their advantages in 
applied to simulated reforms. The outcomes conclusions  for the three  countries. terms of simplicity and efficiency. 
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services at the subnational level (as will be seen below). 
Social policies for reducing poverty emphasized pro-
grammes focused on the neediest. 
 In the late 1990s, these trends slowly began to reverse 
as the value of public action in the social sphere was re- 
evaluated and solidarity reappeared as an organizational 
principle. This gave impetus to policies oriented to chan-
nelling more resources to the poorest sectors, and the role 
of social development in fostering productive develop-
ment and economic growth was acknowledged. It was in 
this scenario that ECLAC advocated a reformulation of 
the fiscal covenant that would make the new proposals 
sustainable (ECLAC, 1998).
 The trend since then has clearly been towards increas-
ing social public spending in both absolute and rela-
tive terms. But this change in the amount of resources 
allocated to social policy did not go hand-in-hand with a 
radical change in guiding principles. It was not until the 
turn of the century that the idea of the social role of the 
State began to shift towards a more integrated vision.
 During the 2000s, public policy focused more on 
the universal nature of certain rights, the principle of 
solidarity in financing, protection in the event of loss of 
family income and situations of poverty and exclusion. 
This turning point is in line with the idea of equal rights, 
not only equal opportunities. It is precisely the universal 
nature of rights that shifts the approach from one that 
favours individual capacities and private provision for old 
age and health risks (relegating solidarity and state provi-
sion to a distant second place) towards one that integrates 
both components (ECLAC, 2006).
 In the case of pension systems, the private pillars 
based on individual savings should be seen as comple-
menting a public solidarity pillar with explicit solidarity 
features for those who lack sufficient savings capacity, and 
another, non-contributory pillar for those who do not 
have access to social security benefits. In turn, health care 
systems based on individual insurance should be progres-
sively complemented by insurance pools and guarantees 
of universal coverage. In the fight against poverty, condi-
tional transfer programmes gain predominance, link-
ing cash transfers to certain behaviours, such as school 
attendance, medical check-ups, vaccinations and booster 
doses —i.e., human capital improvement. This is based 
on the idea that, since the strategies used by the poorest 
to deal with the vagaries of economic activity can lead to 
negative human capital savings and perpetuate poverty, 
action that targets both the causes and the consequences 
of poverty can halt its intergenerational reproduction 
(Villatoro, 2007). 
 Nevertheless, despite the change in approach and the 
upward trend in resources available for social policy, the 
4. Distributive impact of social policies
4.1 Social policy focus in the region
1. Social policy focus and evolution of social spending 
in Latin America
The debt crisis of the early 1980s brought significant restrictions 
in both the magnitude and the composition of social spending 
in the region. Redefining the role of the public sector in the 
economy was part of wide-ranging structural reforms, as were, 
inter alia, trade liberalization, opening the economy up to 
foreign investment, price deregulation, market deregulation, 
greater labour market flexibility and privatization of public 
enterprises (ECLAC, 1998).
There were two main drivers behind State reform. The 
first was the need to reformulate the types of intervention 
as the prevailing model of the State as benefactor faced 
increased difficulties. The second was the financial restric-
tions imposed by the crisis. To cover the fiscal deficit, 
policy was geared to reduce public spending, particularly 
its social component. This weakened the social role of 
the State in providing and regulating certain goods and 
services. In some countries, social spending was cut, and 
some social services were privatized —pension and health 
care systems among them. In other cases, they were de-
centralized and removed from the purview of the central 
government under schemes that did not always take ap-
propriate sectoral planning criteria or distributive impact 
into consideration.
 In the case of pensions and following a long tradition 
of pay-as-you-go regimes and inter- and intra- genera-
tional solidarity with varying degrees of coverage, it was 
sought to tie individual benefits more closely to individ-
ual contributions. The goal was to buttress the financial 
solvency of contributory systems, foster broader coverage 
(by making the contributions seem more like savings and 
less like taxes) and, no less important, remove from the 
sphere of public policy the challenge posed by demo-
graphic transition, which required ever-increasing rises in 
contributions to cover the needs of a growing number of 
pensioners.
 As for health care, private insurance (which usually 
closely links health risks to the contributions a person 
must make to cover them) was promoted. So, in a depar-
ture from tradition, solidarity was not a key organiza-
tional principle in this very restrictive approach to public 
intervention focused on serving the most disadvantaged 
segments of society. Moreover, the decentralization of 
education and public health systems was encouraged, 
with the resulting problems in financing and providing 
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availability of public resources is still severely restricted by 
persistent low tax burdens, tax collection difficulties and 
growth volatility. 
 In this new state of affairs and after five years of 
successful outcomes in reducing poverty, unemployment 
and income inequality, the world financial crisis and its 
impacts have given new meaning to the role of the State 
as regulator and intervenor in the face of market failures 
and asymmetries. But this return to certain organiza-
tional principals for social policy in the region has come 
with innovations in both practice and theory that have 
brought the concepts of social capital, cohesion and se-
curity against risk back into the debate. On the practical 
level, the adoption of information and communication 
technologies by governments has, for example, made it 
possible to expand conditional transfer programmes for 
the neediest households and administer taxes with higher 
redistributive effects whose complexity was previously 
considered an obstacle to achieving their goal at a reason-
able cost. Conceptually, there is renewed concern about 
inequality while recognizing the obvious limitations of 
the contributions that individuals and the market can 
make to solve such problems. In short, the State acquires 
greater strategic weight in the quest to address the prob-
lems caused by inequality and the lack of well-being.
 As the approach to the issue and the policies put 
in place evolved, social spending rose by more than five 
percentage points of GDP between 1990 and 2008 and 
increased significantly as a percentage of total public 
spending (see figure 20). In absolute terms, social public 
spending per inhabitant nearly doubled in 2006-
2007 compared with 1990-1991 and reached US$ 820 (at
2000 prices), i.e., an 18% increase over 2004-2005. These 
increases revealed a marked difference between countries 
—as much as 20 times more in countries with higher per-
capita spending than in those with lower spending levels. 
 The largest omcreases were in social security, educa-
tion and social assistance. Overall, the information avail-
able indicates that education, health care and social assist-
ance are the functions thar effectively generate progressive 
distribution (see figure 21). Specifically, targeted social 
assistance, primary education and primary health care are 
progressive. Although higher education and hospital care 
are progressive with regard to the primary distribution of 
income, they remain regressive when considered sepa-
rately (ECLAC, 2010a).
As box I.1 shows, one of the problems with social spending 
in the region is its highly procyclical nature. This explains the 
marked impact of crises and growth slowdowns on poverty and 
vulnerability, because segments with fewer resources needed to 
address these deficiencies. It was not until the past decade that 
some countries began to take a countrercyclical approach to 
social spending, recognizing the role that positive emplyment 
and household income dynamics play in narrowing gaps and 
consolidating well-being. Moreover, the current financial crisis 
and its effects on the real economy have led the governments of 
the region to redouble and diversify their countercyclical social 
spending.
 But despite these advances, the redistributive content of 
social spending is still insufficient and should be enhanced 
in order to narrow even further the gaps in health, educa-
tion, housing and social conditions in general that lead to the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality and poverty. The 
current debate has highlighted three key areas for redistribu-
tive policy and for ending the intergenerational transmission of 
poverty and its conditioning factors, in which social policy is 
very effective: reducing poverty during childhood and old age, 
and reducing the effects of unemployment.
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The largest omcreases were in social security, education
and social assistance. Overall, the information available 
indicates that education, health care and social assistance
are the functions thar effectively generate progressive 
distribution (see figure III.2). Specifically, targeted social 
assistance, primary education and primary health care are 
progressive. Although higher education and hospital care 
are progressive with regard to the primary distribution of 
income, they remain regressive when considered separately 
(ECLAC, 2010a). 
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2. Transfers to address childhood poverty and precari-
ous old age and to protect the unemployed
In Latin America, the poverty rate among children is far 
higher than in the adult population. Measures taken in 
the past few years to address this situation include cash 
transfers and reformed family allowance systems that not 
only seek to ensure a minimum family income but are 
also conditional on keeping children in school and com-
plying with certain periodic health care protocols (vac-
cinations, check-ups).1   These programmes are relevant 
redistribution instruments geared to level out conditions 
for children and other vulnerable groups. Between 60% 
and 75% of these transfer expenses are captured by the 
poorest 40% of the population (see figure 23). However, 
spending on such programmes accounts for, on average, 
only 0.25% of GDP and 2.3% of social spending in the 
region. And they are far from attaining satisfactory cover-
age.
 A recent ECLAC study shows that a cash transfer to 
children under five years of age equivalent to the value 
of one poverty line would decrease the number of poor 
households by a maximum of 7.4% in Guatemala and a 
minimum of 2% in Uruguay and would mean substantial 
progress at the regional level. For certain more developed 
countries, this would involve resources equal to 0.8% to 
1.6% of GDP and would thus be achievable within a very 
few years. By contrast, in the poorest countries it would 
mean as much as 6.4% of GDP annually; this shows 
the serious challenge that these countries face (ECLAC, 
2010b).
 At the other end of the age range, despite substantial 
pension system reform efforts centred mostly on more 
closely linking contributions and benefits, there are still 
problems in preventing poverty among the aged. These 
problems arise from structural limitations associated with 
the characteristics of the region’s labour market: high 
degree of informality and frequent periods of unemploy-
ment; low labour participation rates among poor women; 
inadequate reach of formal schemes in rural areas; and, 
perhaps most important, low wages in broad segments of 
the productive apparatus (ECLAC, 2006; Tokman, 2006; 
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 These factors together mean that a significant number
of persons participating in private systems would not ac-
cumulate enough resources to draw a minimum pension, 
especially in the case of less skilled workers and women. 
And there is still a need to prevent poverty in old age for 
large groups that do not participate (due to rurality or 
informality) but would in the future press for government 
support for their survival. In response, a new wave of 
reforms is seeking to create or strengthen a solidarity pil-
lar funded by a pool of contributions while putting new 
emphasis on non-contributory schemes financed by taxes. 
 Willmore (2006) analysed what the cost of a univer-
sal, uniform pension would be in the countries of the re-
gion.26 More recently, ECLAC (2010a) estimated the cost 
of transferring the equivalent of one poverty line to all 
persons over 65 under a universal scheme or of targeting 
benefits to members of vulnerable households. With the 
universal scheme, the cost ranges between 1.8% and 5.7% 
of GDP per annum; for the targeted scheme it varies from 
0.3% to 4.2% of annual GDP. Again, these figures are 
more onerous for countries with a higher poverty rate and 
lower per-capita GDP.
 Beyond the difficulty of establishing the order of 
causality between poverty and unemployment, there is 
no denying that unemployment has a greater impact on 
poor households, makes systems of saving for old age less 
effective and often means the loss of social benefits, such 
as access to protection from health risks, that often come 
only with a contractual employment relationship.
 To mitigate these consequences, some of the coun-
tries of the region have established unemployment insur-
ance that provides compensatory, transitory income while
improving prospects for productive reinsertion. But only 
seven countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have 
such an instrument. Coverage and benefits are usually 
limited and apply only to workers in the formal sector
—and, among these, to those who have a certain degree 
of job stability because entitlement to benefits hinges on 
remaining for a minimum period of time in the job from 
which contributions to the system are made (Velásquez,
2010). During the recent crisis some of these schemes 
have been reformulated to make them more countercy-
clical by, for example, making access to them easier or 
combining them with training mechanisms. Neverthe-
less, their dissemination and institutionalization are still 
limited in most of the countries of the region.
 The challenge of improving the efficiency and redis-
tributive effect of unemployment insurance lies in broad-
ening its coverage, linking it more closely to active labour 
market policies and integrating it with other protection 
mechanisms such as severance pay and non-contributory 
systems that provide support for low-income families. In 
view of the limited coverage provided by unemployment 
insurance, many countries have emergency employment 
programmes that are activated, above all, during crises 
and help cover the income needs of persons in the infor-
mal sector or rural areas. An alternative to such a regime 
could be the creation of non-contributory unemployment 
insurance systems that would broaden protection; benefits 
could, perhaps, be conditional on training programmes or 
other measures geared to improve employability.
26 See details on the relevance of this alternative for poor countries in Willmore (2006).
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2. Transfers to address childhood poverty and precarious old age 
and to protect the unemployed 
In Latin America, the poverty rate among children is far 
higher than in the adult population. Measures taken in 
the past few years to address this situation include cash 
transfers and reformed family allowance systems that 
not only seek to ensure a minimum family income but 
are also conditional on keeping children in school and 
complying with certain periodic health care protocols 
(vaccinations, check-ups).1   These programmes are 
relevant redistribution instruments geared to level out 
conditions for children and other vulnerable groups. 
Between 60% and 75% of these transfer expenses are 
captured by the poorest 40% of the population (see 
figure III.4). However, spending on such programmes 
accounts for, on average, only 0.25% of GDP and 2.3% 
of social spending in the region. And they are far from 
attaining satisfactory coverage. 
A recent ECLAC study shows that a cash transfer to 
children under five years of age equivalent to the value 
of one poverty line would decrease the number of poor 
households by a maximum of 7.4% in Guatemala and a 
minimum of 2% in Uruguay and would mean substantial 
progress at the regional level. For certain more developed 
countries, this would involve resources equal to 0.8% 
to 1.6% of GDP and would thus be achievable within 
a very few years. By contrast, in the poorest countries 
it would mean as much as 6.4% of GDP annually; this 
shows the serious challenge that these countries face 
(ECLAC, 2010b). 
At the other end of the age range, despite substantial 
pension system reform efforts centred mostly on more 
closely linking contributions and benefits, there are still 
problems in preventing poverty among the aged. These 
problems arise from structural limitations associated 
with the characteristics of the region’s labour market: 
high degree of informality and frequent periods of 
unemployment; low labour participation rates among 
poor women; inadequate reach of formal schemes in 
rural areas; and, perhaps most important, low wages in 
broad segments of the productive apparatus (ECLAC, 
2006; Tokman, 2006; Cetrángulo and Grushka, 2004; 
Jiménez and Cuadros, 2003). 
Figure 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time 
for equality: closing gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432(SES.33/3)), Santiago, 
Chile, 2010. 
a     The year of the survey used differs from one country to the next. The data for 1990
 correspond to the available survey closest to that year. The data for 2002 correspond
to the most recent surveys available between 2000 and 2002, and those for 2008 
are from surveys available between 2004 and 2008. 
b     Metropolitan area. 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Time 
for equality: closing gaps, opening trails (LC/G.2432 (SES.33/3)), Santiago, 
Chile, 2010. 
a     Simple average. 
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Unlike what was expected, introducing capitalization com-
ponents did not lead to an increase in contributory participa-
tion or to complete self-funding of benefits for most of those 
enrolled in these systems. Under such a regime contributions 
would be more like savings than like taxes, but lower-income 
groups, tending to prioritize present consumption over 
future consumption, often remain outside the system. The 
result is that effective coverage is no broader than under the 
previous scheme. At the same time, the higher incidence of 
unemployment and informality in lower-income groups is 
reflected in their lower contribution density, leading to lower 
accumulation of savings. And even for those low-income 
groups that manage to stay active in the new system and 
attain an adequate contribution density, low income means 
little accumulation of resources and will likewise make them 
candidates for subsidies to bring them up to the minimum 
pensions guaranteed by the State. In short, such systems are 
not likely to overcome the exclusions that characterize the re-
gion’s labour market. On the contrary: adding individually-
funded accounts removed a good deal of the solidarity inher-
ent to pay- as-you go systems, turning employment inequities 
into welfare inequities (Cuadros and Jiménez, 2004).
 As stated above, the region now faces a scenario charac-
terized by marked social segmentation in the labour sphere 
(formal workers, informal workers and the unemployed) and, 
therefore, in the area of social protection. Low collections 
because of growing informality, combined with the demand 
for additional resources arising from the financial imbalances 
of pre-existing pay-as-you-go pension systems that are still 
paying their beneficiaries, have often displaced other social 
policies geared to channel resources to lower-income sectors. 
Generally speaking, financial sustainability and fiscal deficit 
problems remained in those countries that introduced substi-
tute individual funding schemes, because the transition costs 
were higher and more persistent than expected.28 As a result, 
in some countries a gap is opening between total spending 
on pensions and the spending that has redistributive effects, 
as figure 24 shows for Argentina and Chile.
 The main lesson to be learned from these reforms is that 
the reality of the region’s labour markets does not allow bas-
ing a pension system on the contributory component alone. 
Because of labour market exclusions and segmentation, this 
would lead to marked inequalities and undersaving for old 
age that the State will have to address more sooner than later. 
The contributory component will have to be reinforced by 
incorporating solidarity mechanisms in the funding of ben-
efits. This is, in part, the approach taken by recent pension 
system reforms in the region. Noteworthy among them is the 
pension reform in Chile discussed in box III.1.
28 See the discussion of the fiscal costs of  substitutive reform in Rodríguez Herrera and 
Durán Valverde (2000).
4.2 Social policies in the areas of pensions, 
health and education
The impact of social policies on distribution does not de-
pend solely on the initiative involved or how a programme is 
designed, on the magnitude of the public resources involved 
or on the coverage of the beneficiary population. It also 
depends on how they are financed. This section will high-
light the distributive impact of social policy financing. The 
debate on the formulation and financing of social policies 
entails two key lines of discussion. The first has to do with 
contributory versus non-contributory financing of social 
protection. The other involves a necessary stock- taking of 
the region’s experience with decentralization over the past 
30 years and the advisability (and feasibility) of ensuring 
the local origin of that financing as well as the consequences 
thereof for equity and fiscal consistency. 
 
1. Pension systems
 In the case of contributory pay-as-you-go pension systems, 
demographic transition (which invariably increased the 
number of pensioners with relation to contributors), the 
failure to adjust contribution rate parameters or eligibil-
ity requirements, the presence of sectoral privileges and a 
voluntaristic definition of replacement rates led to designs 
that did not ensure the solvency of the system over time. 
Later came the tensions deriving from globalization, which 
resulted in certain cases in rising open unemployment rates 
and the reassignment of the workforce to less productive 
sectors or self-employment. This helped spur different kinds 
of reform that, to varying degrees, sought a closer link 
between contributions and benefits.
 Pension system reforms can be classed in two major 
groups: structural reforms and parametric reforms. The 
former include the adoption of three alternative models: 
(i) the pure substitution model, with individual funding 
being the only option; (ii) the parallel model, which retains 
a reformed (public) pay-as-you-go regime alongside the indi-
vidually funded model and allows workers to opt for one or 
the other; and (iii) the mixed model, in which the worker 
contributes simultaneously to both systems. In practice, 
there is no pure model; almost all of the countries have 
some kind of assistance transfer system for old age or com-
plementary private schemes. Parametric reform, as the name 
suggests, retains the general profile or basic structure of the 
pre-existing system but changes the calculation algorithms 
and the values for strategic variables (contribution rates, 
legal retirement age and replacement rates, among others). 
 However, the reforms carried out did not resolve all 
of the complex problems of the region’s pension systems.27 
27 See details on the relevance of this alternative for poor countries in Willmore (2006).
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Box III.1 
THE RECENT PENSION REFORM IN CHILE 
Up to 1979, Chile’s contributory pension joining the labour force in or after 1983— the designed to redress the status of women; 
system was a public pay-as-you-go system, Institute of Social Security Standardization create incentives for young persons to pay 
with many special regimes. It was replaced was created in the framework of the public in to the system; gradually require own- 
with an individual funding regime based contributory system. It was an independent account workers to participate; apply new 
on compulsory  defined  contributions agency with its own capital created to manage regulations geared to improve the efficiency 
(made by the worker for an equivalent of the pension systems that had been the and transparency of the  pension fund 
up to 10% of wages) managed by pension responsibility of the previous pension entities administration company industry; redesign 
fund managers (AFPs) that charge a fee (Provident Funds), among other functions. the institutional framework of the pension 
to cover administrative costs and provide  A novel structural reform for improving system and formulate a funding policy 
disability and survival insurance and are the pension system was approved in 2008, consistent with fiscal commitments. 
subject to regulation and oversight by the and implementation began  that  same  This reform is so extensive that it can 
Superintendency of AFPs. year. The reform had a broader scope: be considered structural —not only does 
In addition to creating a new pension add a solidarity pillar by creating a basic it improve the existing system but it brings 
scheme —in which participation was voluntary solidarity-based pension and providing a in new components that recognize and 
for those who had been paying in to the publicly-funded pension top-up for low- institutionalize the mixed nature of its sources 
previous system and compulsory for those income pensioners; grant a set benefits of funding, as the table below shows. 
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Some of the principle components of  (ii) Child bonus: All women over 65 workers (age 18 to 35 who receive up to 
the reform are described below.  who begin to draw a pension on or after 1.5 minimum wages), equivalent to 50% of the 
(i) Solidarity benefit: This is a publicly- 1 July 2009 will receive a bonus for each minimum-wage-based social  security 
funded benefit granted to those who live-born child, equal to 12 months of social contribution, for the first 24 contributions 
are entitled to a pension lower than the security contributions based on 10% of the (continuous or  discontinuous); and a 
maximum pension funded by solidarity minimum wage, funded in accordance with contribution subsidy paid directly by the 
contributions. It supplements and is inversely the return on pension fund C.  State to the young worker’s individually- 
proportional to the self-funded pension that  (iii) Greater coverage for young workers: funded account, in the same amount as 
an individual receives.  Two tax-funded contributions will be paid: a the subsidy described above. This benefit 
hiring subsidy for employers who hire young is effective from 1 July 2011. 
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mentary role to the public sector). There are both public and 
private providers of health care services. The Cuban health 
care system is similar to these, but services are provided by 
the public system alone.
 In Brazil, with adoption of the 1988 Constitution the 
right of workers to health care provided under social secu-
rity was made universal and comprehensive. That was the 
starting point for the creation of a single public health care 
system funded out of general revenues that integrated al-
most all of the social security schemes. The Brazilian system 
thus comprises just two subsectors: public and private.
 Costa Rica is an example of another kind of system, 
which combines funding from general revenues and 
the contributory system. Unlike Brazil, Costa Rica kept 
wage-based contributions earmarked for an agency (the 
Costa Rican Social Security Fund) that also receives fiscal 
contributions to serve those who have no contributory 
capacity.29The fund operates like an insurance system and 
provides uniform coverage for all participants. Integrating 
the different income groups (that use the same facilities and 
receive the same level of services) has been the main factor 
behind the success of Costa Rica’s health care policy.30
 Another group of countries comprises those in which 
the different sources of funding are integrated but coverage 
is differentiated on the basis of whether the funding is con-
tributory or not. Antigua and Barbuda, Colombia and the 
Dominican Republic are examples, as Uruguay will be once 
the reform under way is in place. Colombia is especially 
interesting, with its health care reform that began in 1993, 











29 State participation in funding is through three different channels: (i) the State makes 
a minor contribution that supplements the one paid in by employees and employers; 
(ii) it covers nearly 50% of the contribution for independent workers and voluntary 
participants; and (iii) it covers 100% of the contribution for the poorest segment of the 
population, which lacks contributory capacity.
30 However, over the past few years persons with greater resources have tended more and 
more to use private primary care and specialized services instead of public services. This 
has not affected the system’s solidarity because this group continues to pay in to social 
security, but it does create incentives for contributor evasion.
2. Health care systems
As discussed in ECLAC (2009b), social protection systems 
in the region are highly dissimilar, with the differences 
between countries depending on the relative weight of State, 
market and family contributions to welfare. The smaller 
the weight of the State, the more important out- of-pocket 
spending becomes, and the ability to weather volatile 
economic cycles is exposed to market forces and family in-
come. This is particularly relevant in the case of health care 
systems, where the need to incur out-of-pocket expenses to 
obtain care or medication is a significant source of ineq-
uity. The larger the contribution made by public spending 
the more equitable and redistributive health care spending 
will be, while a greater proportion of private spending is 
indicative of a smaller degree of solidarity within the system 
(ECLAC, 2006; Uthoff, 2010).
 Health care system segmentation is present in practical-
ly all of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
There is a wide variety of health care system institutions and 
mechanisms for financing, insuring, regulating and provid-
ing services that, in general, combine a specialized public 
system with certain functions of the social security systems 
and the private sector. The working of the system as a whole 
depends on how these three subsectors are related.
 The public sector is usually the only mechanism for 
covering the population with no contributory capacity 
(that is, the uninsured population uses the public network 
of providers). Some social security systems, in addition to 
paying pensions, operate health care services, cover formal 
workers and may have their own network of hospitals and 
providers. And the private sector usually serves the higher- 
income population under insurance arrangements and a 
private- provider structure. As a rule, households in the 
highest quintiles report a greater degree of participation in 
insurance systems; families in the first and second quintiles 
are usually covered by the public system.
 Institutional arrangements in the region vary widely, 
ranging from public services funded exclusively by general 
revenues, to systems where contributory funding and the 
national budget are integrated to a certain degree, to the 
other extreme in countries with little or no connection 
between the two, as can be seen in box III.1 (ECLAC, 
2006). One group of countries has health care systems that 
provide uniform public benefits for the entire population, 
funded exclusively by general revenues. This group includes 
the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean, Brazil and 
Cuba.
 The prevailing system in the countries of the English-
speaking Caribbean is one in which funding is essentially 
non-contributory and is based on taxes, with no explicit 
separation between procurement, insurance and the provi-
sion of services (the private sector plays a subsidiary, comple-
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 Among the systems with a certain degree of integra-
tion is Chile’s, as a unique variant that could be classed 
as a dual, partially integrated model. One of the salient 
features of the reform initiated in 1981 was segmentation, 
with compulsory contributions to the health care system 
that could be earmarked, at the contributor’s choice, for 
a sort of public health insurance plan —the National 
Health Fund (FONASA)— or for private health insurance 
institutions (ISAPRE). If the compulsory contribution is 
earmarked for the National Health Fund, the contributor 
is a member of the public system. If the contribution is 
channelled to a private health insurance institution, the 
member is covered by one of the health plans it offers, 
depending on payment capacity and risk. In this system, 
the public sector and social security are linked through 
the National Health Fund and the Universal Access with 
Explicit Guarantees (AUGE plan).31 The National Health 
Fund is funded by contributions from members and fiscal 
31 The AUGE plan covers a set of  health conditions for which care is guaranteed 
by both the public system and the private system.
contributions out of general revenues, to provide cover-
age for those with no contributory capacity. Within the 
National Health Fund, access to AUGE plan benefits is 
not tied to contributions. At this basic level, then, there is 
solidarity among contributors and noncontributors. For 
access to other National Health Fund services, however, 
there are co-payments that vary depending on the benefi-
ciary’s income bracket and the cost of the service. Despite 
this solidarity mechanism, the duality of the system as 
a whole and the individual nature of private insurance 
coverage hamper the complete integration of funding and 
work against equality.
 Unlike Colombia, where there are risk compensation 
mechanisms, private insurance in Chile leads to discrimi-
nation based on individual contributors’ health risks and 
thus to situations that run contrary to the goals of rights-
based social policy. First, the marked difference between 
health programme premiums discriminates against 
women of child- bearing age and older adults, because 
of their higher health risks. Second, this difference leads, 
in practice, to private insurers screening participants 
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to other National Health Fund services, however, there are 
co-payments that vary depending on the beneficiary’s 
income bracket and the cost of the service. Despite this 
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and the individual nature of private insurance coverage 
hamper the complete integration of funding and work 
against equality. 
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based on individual contributors’ hea th risks and thus to 
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risks. Second, this difference leads, in practice, to private 
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is guaranteed by both the public system and the private system. 
 
Box III.2 
THE COLOMBIAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE 1993 REFORM 
 
In 1993 Colombia radically changed its health  The public health care system is seen  In addition to these subsystems, 
care system and began to transition from the as a transitional arrangement for the segment there are the so-called exempt regimes. 
traditional three-tier format seen in many of the population that is still uninsured. It is These regimes receive contributions from 
countries in Latin America (public health care funded by national taxes and, to a lesser members and have their own mechanisms 
system funded by taxes, for the population extent, by local taxes. In 2008 this subsystem for engaging health care system providers. 
segment unable to pay; social security system served 14% of the population.The contributory The average contribution is higher than for 
funded by wage-based contributions for regime is geared to the population segment the other regimes and the services provided 
formal workers; and private medical care for that is able to pay, and its participants are are better, with the resulting inequities.These 
higher-income segments) towards a universal entitled to care under the  compulsory regimes offer coverage for members of the 
insurance system. The purpose of the new subsidized health plan.This regime covered armed forces and the national police force, 
system is to ensure that the entire population approximately 39% of the population in 2008. employees of the Colombian Petroleum 
has access to a single package of health Contributors pay in 12.5% of their wages, with Company (ECOPETROL) and other closed 
care services —the compulsory subsidized 1.5 percentage points being channelled to groups of public servants. It is estimated 
health plan (POSS)— regardless of socio- the subsidized regime to fund the system’s that 3% of the population belonged to these 
economic status or risk level. In practice, solidarity component. In addition, the Health regimes in 2008. 
the reform led to the appearance of several Promotion Agencies (EPSs) receive risk-  High-income individuals usually belong 
subsystems that are far less segmented than adjusted capitation payments, which adds to private plans for complementary coverage; 
in the previous system. However, differences other redistributive components: income approximately 6% of the population does 
in access and quality of service do persist, level, age and health status.  so. To keep participation in such plans from 
depending on the subsystem and beneficiary  The subsidized regime serves the draining resources from the general system, 
population involved.  insured population that is unable to pay, participation in the contributory regime is 
In the General System  of  Social subject to a means test for eligibility. In a requisite for joining an additional, private 
Security in Health (SGSSS) inaugurated this subsystem, members are entitled to coverage plan. 
with the 1993 reform, public and private care under the compulsory subsidized  Despite the successful outcomes of the 
insurance and service providers coexist health plan, which is more limited than reform, there are still barriers to health care 
and the population is free to choose the under the contributory regime. In 2008 access in Colombia and inequities therefore 
insurer. The new arrangement includes the nearly 44% of the population belonged persist. The reasons for the remaining 
following subsystems: to this system. Funding comes from the segmentation lie in the attempt to preserve 
•   Public health care system for the solidarity contribution made by members the status quo, both by the beneficiaries 
uninsured of the contributory regime (approximately of the old social security system and by 
•   Contributory regime 34% of the subsidized regime’s budget other groups and institutions (public and 
•   Subsidized regime revenues in 2009) and from national and private health care organizations, medical 
•   Exempt regimes local taxes (which accounted for 64% of associations and others). 
•   Private services for the uninsured revenues that same year). 
 
Source: Úrsula Giedion and Olga Lúcia Acosta, “El impacto distributivo de la reforma colombiana de 1993”, document presented in the workshop on distributive impact in 
public policies, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 28-29 April 2010. 
 
3. Education systems
It is generally agreed that education furthers inclusive
development. A society with good education outcomes that 
extend to most of the population tends to have less income 
dispersion. This is due to increasing income from work and 
the positive impact in terms of health, the integration of the 
population into networks and access to decision-making 
levels.  
 According to the Universal Declaration of Human 
rights, everyone has the right to free education (at least in 
the elementary and fundamental stages), and education 
shall be compulsory.33 But, beyond coverage, there is con-
cern as to the quality of education services provided. From 
a rights-based point of view, a quality education enables 
students not only to acquire knowledge and skills but also 
to develop values, attitudes and behaviours (UNESCO and 
OREALC, 2008).
 In this sense, education coverage in the countries of the 
region has improved considerably since 1990. School attend-
ance among primary-school age children is almost universal. 
Access for children and young people at higher levels has 
increased thanks to expanded school coverage and better 
education system retention capacity (ECLAC, 2007). But 
the significant progress made in access to education is still 
marred by the high degree of inequality in terms of educa-
tion received and learning skills acquired that has its root in 
the unequal social structure of the countries of the region.  
 Generally speaking, public and private education 
systems coexist in the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Public education is financed for the most part by 
33 United Nations, 1948.
based on risk, accepting those with a lower risk profile 
and shunting riskier, less profitable groups to the public 
system.
 Another group consists of those countries in the 
region that have systems where public funding and social 
security are not integrated. Generally speaking, in this 
group fairly fragmented social security systems coexist 
with multiple institutions; there are no mechanisms for 
coordination and little solidary funding.32
 To make a health care system more equitable, moving
toward universal coverage should be a priority. The mini-
mum requirements for attaining this goal are reconcil-
ing the subsystems (public, social security and private 
medicine); integrating contributory and non-contributory 
sources of funding by incorporating explicit, transparent 
solidarity features; and lowering the barriers to health care 
access for lower-income population segments, ensuring 
efficient and quality care.
32 The countries in this group are Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,  Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of  
Bolivia and Uruguay.
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insurers screening participants based on risk, accepting 
those with a lower risk profile and shunting riskier, less 
profitable groups to the public system. 
Another group consists of those countries in the 
region that have systems where public funding and social 
security are not integrated. Generally speaking, in this 
group fairly fragmented social security systems coexist 
with multiple institutions; there are no mechanisms for 
coordination and little solidary funding.8 
To make a health care system more equitable, moving 
toward universal coverage should be a priority. The minimum 
requirements for attaining this goal are reconciling the 
subsystems (public, social security and private medicine); 
integrating contributory and non-contributory sources of 
funding by incorporating explicit, transparent solidarity 
features; and lowering the barriers to health care access 
for lower-income population segments, ensuring efficient 
and quality care. 
Table III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMBINATIONS OF PUBLIC FUNDING AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR a 
by a combination of general revenues general revenues and social security financed by general revenues 
In all cases, there is a certain degree of 
explicit separation between financing and 
the provision of services. The degree to 
which financing is integrated varies as well. 
Services are structurally varied: different 
types of relationship exist between 
the public and private sectors. 
Services are structurally varied: different 
types of relationship exist between 
the public and private sectors 
Countries with public and private services: 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,b  Jamaica, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago 
Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Panama, 
Plurinational State of Bolivia 
Antigua and Barbuda, Dominican Republic,c 
Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Shaping the Future of Social Protection: Access, Financing and Solidarity (LC/G.2294(SES.31/3)/E), 
Santiago, Chile, February 2006. 
a     In all countries, except Cuba, there is also a private subsector that provides health services. 
b     In Haiti there is practically no social security, and the provision and financing of health services  are undertaken principally by the public sector and non-
governmental organizations. 
c       The Dominican Republic is in a transition period, implementing health reforms aimed at greater integration of financing. 
3. Education systems 
be compulsory.9 But, beyond coverage, there is concern 
as to the quality of education services provided. From a 
rights-based point of view, a quality education enables 
students not only to acquire knowledge and skills but also 
to develop values, attitudes and behaviours (UNESCO 
and OREALC, 2008). 
In this sense, education coverage in  countries 
of the region has improved considerably since 1990. 
School attendance among primary-school age children is 
almost universal. Access for children and young people 
at higher levels has increased thanks to expanded school 
coverage and better education system retention capacity 
(ECLAC, 2007). But the significant progress made in 
It is generally agreed that education furthers inclusive 
development. A society with good education outcomes 
that extend to most of the population tends to have less 
income dispersion. This is due to increasing income 
from work and the positive impact in t rms of health, the 
integration of the population into networks and access to 
decision-making levels. 
According to the Universal Declaration of Human 
rights, everyone has the right to free education (at least in 
the elementary and fundamental stages), and education shall 
8 The countries in this group are Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,  
Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 9 United Nations, 1948. 
   
Countries with services provided by 
the public system only: Cuba 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Countries with health care systems Countries with health care systems financed Countries that do not combine 




central or national government budget resources, by inter-
mediate governments (such as provinces and states), or by 
local or municipal governments, as well as by private- sector 
resources (such as donations and transfers). Private educa-
tion is financed by payments from users.
 The relative importance of private financing has 
increased in the region, as has family spending on educa-
tion. This has an effect on distributive impact (ECLAC and 
UNESCO, 2004). If spending is proportional to a family’s 
budget and its elasticity depends on the resources or savings 
at the family’s disposal, it is to be expected that an increase 
in private spending favours the concentration of more re-
sources in higher-income groups where education outcomes 
in terms of years of schooling and effective learning are 
already better than for the rest of society. Family contribu-
tions account for most private spending on education, so 
consideration must be given to their impact on equity, that 
is, on the equality of opportunities for access and attain-
ment and on the education system for girls and boys from 
different socio- economic groups, ethnicities and localities. 
If increasing the family contribution has a direct impact on 
the quality of education that the children receive, there is a 
clear risk that the gap in education outcomes among social 
strata will tend to grow rather than decrease.
 There are two types of public financing: (i) resources 
channelled to the education sector by supply mechanisms; 
and (ii) those based on demand, via subsidies for students 
and their families. In Latin America, the dominant models 
are those in which resources are allocated directly on 
the basis of supply, depending on the specific features of 
each school. Chile, on the other hand, is an example of a 
demand-oriented mechanism. Between 1980 and 1986, 
approximately, Chile underwent one of the most radical 
reforms that have ever taken place in the region. Education 
was decentralized and made the responsibility of munici-
palities, and the groundwork was laid for a marked increase 
in the role of private education in providing services to the 
system. But this scheme had a regressive distributive bias 
that democratic administrations sought to correct with suc-
cessive reforms.3410
 A strategy for achieving equality in education must give 
priority to expanding coverage at the preschool level and 
lengthening the school day in public schools, improving 
secondary completion rates in socio-economic sectors with 
lower achievement levels (considering that coverage and 
completion are now almost universal for primary education 
in the region) and reducing the learning and knowledge 
gaps built up over the education cycle from preschool to the 
end of the secondary cycle) (ECLAC, 2010b).
34 Chile’s education finance system consists of  a portable, demand- side per-student 
subsidy that is given to the establishment where the student is enrolled. Over 
the past few years, the system has changed considerably from its original design. 
Legislation enacted in 1993 authorized co-payments by parents to subsidized esta-
blishments. To address the increasingly regressive nature of  the education system, 
in 2007 Congress passed the Preferential School Subsidy Act targeting priority or 
vulnerable students. New programmes were implemented as well; the level and 
structure of  teacher pay scales were changed, and other, minor payments were 
added based on the characteristics of  each establishment. Further changes were 
made over time without altering the core of  the system —a fully portable per-
student subsidy— despite the fact that the underlying problem with the system 
was its highly regressive nature. See Romaguera and Gallegos (2010).
of GDP in federal countries (averaging 13% of GDP 
in Argentina and Brazil) and in decentralized unitary 
countries like Colombia. In such countries, subnational 
governments account for 25% to 45% of total non-finan-
cial public sector spending. Moreover, these countries are 
usually those with a larger geographical area and greater 
internal disparities, making decentralization more of a 
governance tool than an option for public policy and for 
organizing social services.
 The increase in subnational government spending 
took place mainly in the education and health sectors, 
which became a priority in the region’s more decentral-
ized countries and account for more than 40% of total 
subnational government spending (di Gropello and 
Cominetti, 1998; Cetrángolo, 2007). In Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
subnational governments execute more than 70% of total 
public spending on education and approximately one half 
of public spending on health (see figure 25).
4.3. Assigning functions to different levels 
of government
 
An additional factor to consider when assessing the dis-
tributive impact of social policies has to do with the level 
of government responsible for providing them. Over the 
past 30 years, the Latin American and Caribbean region 
has seen the decentralization of many competencies and 
functions that have been reassigned from the central 
government to subnational levels.
 This devolution of responsibilities to intermediate 
and local governments entailed a substantial increase in 
public spending at the subnational level in the past few 
decades. Table III.2 shows the marked rise in subnational 
government spending in some countries, such as Argen-
tina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. The level of subnational spending is 
closely linked to the institutional framework of the coun-
try in question and is more than eight percentage points 
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institutional framework of the country in question and 
is more than eight percentage points of GDP in federal 
countries (averaging 13% of GDP in Argentina and Brazil) 
and in decentralized unitary countries like Colombia. 
In such countries, subnational governments account for 
25% to 45% of total non-financial public sector spending. 
Moreover, these countries are usually those with a larger 
geographical area and greater internal disparities, making 
decentralization more of a governance tool th n an op ion 
for public policy and for organizing social services. 
The increase in subnational government spending 
took place mainly in the education and health sectors, 
which became a priority in the region’s more decentralized 
countries and account for more than 40% of total subnational 
government spending (di Gropello and Cominetti, 1998; 
Cetrángolo, 2007). In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, subnational governments 
execute more than 70% f total public spending on 
education and appr ximately one half of public spending 
on health (see figure III.6). 
Table III.2 
LATIN AMERICA: SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING a 
(Percentages of GDP and of total non-financial public sector or central government spending) 
1985-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 
































































































… … 5.3 5.8 6.5 … 18.4 20.0 21.1 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a     The data on subnational governments in Argentina are for provinces; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia they refer to prefectures and municipalities; in Brazil, they are for
states and municipalities; in Chile, they are for municipalities; in Colombia, they refer to departments and municipalities; in Costa Rica, they are for local governments; in
Ecuador, they refer to provincial councils and municipalities; in Mexico, they are for state governments and the Federal District; in Paraguay, they refer to Governor’s Offices;
and in Peru they are for local governments. 
b     The data in the first column refer to 1986-1990. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA: SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
(Percentages) 
(a) Percentages of total subnational spending (b) Percentages of total public spending 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information. 
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To appropriately weight the importance of subnational 
governments in the application of social policies, the 
features of programmes geared to improve social protec-
tion and fight poverty must be borne in mind. It is usu-
ally held that for reasons of efficiency and equity, central 
governments should be responsible for designing and 
funding such programmes. In practice, however, either 
circumstances or ongoing decentralization are making 
programmes executed by intermediate and local govern-
ments increasingly widespread. Box III.3 classes social 
protection and anti-poverty programmes on the basis of 
the level of government executing them.
 Classifying these programmes in Latin America re-
veals how difficult it really is to distribute functions among 
jurisdictions on the basis of theory and regulations.
 Table III.3 summarizes the proposed classification, 
with examples from each case. Initiatives to combat pov-
erty and improve social protection are being implemented 
across the region by different levels of government. 
Particularly noteworthy is the existence of many central 
government programmes that deal with decentralized 
issues. Even more striking are the local programmes that 
address issues associated with centralized policies. Some 
attempts at comprehensive policies linking initiatives at 
different levels of government were identified, but this has 
not always been the case. In any event, it is clear that the 
enormous diversity of situations in the region requires a 
major effort to coordinate the different levels of govern-
ment at times of increased demand for these programmes.
 
 Beyond the theoretical grounding of and the specific
rationale underlying each national experience with decen-
tralization, it is important to note that the devolution of 
functions to subnational levels of government is subject 
to a set of conditioning factors and limitations of such 
consequence that they have sparked considerable tension 
between decentralization and other policy objectives. 
Particular attention should be paid to conflicts with fiscal 
sustainability andterritorial and social cohesion.
 The decentralization of functions increases the 
demand for resources by subnational governments so 
they can provide social services, and it can trigger fiscal 
tensions. In addition, increased local autonomy generates 
pressure in wealthier regions to stop contributing to the 
maintenance of public policies in poorer areas, thus jeop-
ardizing social and territorial cohesion. So, while there 
have been many attempts to introduce varying degrees of 
decentralization, the outcomes unquestionably reflect the 
strengths and weaknesses of each country and, above all, 
the financing mechanisms accompanying each process 
(Arredondo, Orozco and De Icaza, 2005).
 It is thus important to bear in mind the factors that 
substantially condition attainment of the objectives pur-
sued by public decentralization policies. The first factor, 
mentioned in chapter II, has to do with the difficulties 
that the countries of the region face in collecting adequate 
tax revenues. Second, the high and unequal territorial dis-
tribution of tax bases makes it very difficult to fulfil the 
fiscal co-responsibility  goals that many of the ongoing 
decentralization processes would require.
 While the main source of financing for the public 
sectors is taxes, these are concentrated mainly at central 
government levels. As figure 26 shows, in the more de-
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institutional framework of the country in question and 
is more than eight percentage points of GDP in federal 
countries (averaging 13% of GDP in Argentina and Brazil) 
and in decentralized unitary countries like Colombia. 
In such countries, subnational governments account for 
25% to 45% of total non-financial public sector spending. 
Moreover, these countries are usually those with a larger 
geographical area and greater internal disparities, making 
decentralization more of a governance tool than an option 
for public policy and for organizing social services. 
The increase in subnational government spending 
took place mainly in the education and health sectors, 
which became a priority in the region’s more decentralized 
countries and account for more than 40% of total subnational 
government spending (di Gropello and Cominetti, 1998; 
Cetrángolo, 2007). In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, subnational governments 
execute more than 70% of total public spending on 
education and approximately one half of public spending 
on health (see figure III.6). 
Table III.2 
LATIN AMERICA: SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING a 
(Percentages of GDP and of total non-financial public sector or central government spending) 
1985-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a     The data on subnational governments in Argentina are for provinces; for the Plurinational State of Bolivia they refer to prefectures and municipalities; in Brazil, they are for
states and municipalities; in Chile, they are for municipalities; in Colombia, they refer to departments and municipalities; in Costa Rica, they are for local governments; in
Ecuador, they refer to provincial councils and municipalities; in Mexico, they are for state governments and the Federal District; in Paraguay, they refer to Governor’s Offices;
and in Peru they are for local governments. 
b     The data in the first column refer to 1986-1990. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA: SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
(Percentages) 
(a) Percentages of total subnational spending (b) Percentages of total public spending 
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A country-by-country analysis of the revenue structure 
at these levels of government shows that transfers are 
substantial in most of them. In Argentina, Mexico and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, they exceed seven percent-
age points of GDP; in Colombia and Ecuador they are in 
the area of 4% of GDP. In Ecuador and Mexico, transfers 
received by intermediate and local levels of government 
are the main source of funding, at 70% of total revenue.
 Factors ranging from the high degree of productive 
disparity in the region to weak subnational tax collec-
tion agencies are behind the slow growth of subnational 
revenues and the high degree of dependence on intergov-
ernmental transfers (Cetrángolo and J.P. Jiménez, 2009). 
As stated earlier, tax collections by subnational govern-
ments have stagnated over the past 11 years and the gaps 
in subnational tax pressure among the countries of Latin 
America have remained constant.36 The poor evolution of 
subnational tax collections in the countries of the region 
is related to the inadequate level and structure of subna-
tional taxes, which are, in turn, related to the available 
tax base.
36 The only countries in which the subnational tax burden has increased are Brazil 
and the Plurinational State of  Bolivia. In Brazil, however, as highlighted by Afonso 
(2004), the sales tax on merchandise and services has increased less than indirect fe-
deral taxes have, because of  fiscal competition between the states concerning this tax.
centralized countries subnational governments contribute 
nearly 20% of total tax revenue. In Brazil, states and mu-
nicipalities collect approximately one third of the total, 
due mainly to revenue from the sales tax on merchandise 
and services (ICMS), which is in the purview of the states 
and the federal district. In more centralized countries 
such as Chile, Costa Rica and Ecuador, on the other 
hand, subnational governments collect less than
6% of the total. Although Mexico is a federal country, 
tax collection is centralized at the federal government 
level; states and municipalities account for just 6% of tax 
collections.35
 Total subnational government tax revenues have 
grown substantially over the past 10 years. However, this 
is due essentially to the growing importance of transfers 
from central governments, not to an increase in their own 
fiscal resources. As figure 27 shows, transfers as a percent-
age of subnational government revenue rose substantially 
between 1997 and 2008 while their own tax revenues 
just went from 2.1% of GDP to 2.6% of GDP during the 
same period.
35 For more details, see J.P. Jiménez and Podestá (2009).
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To appropriately weight the importance of subnational 
governments in the application of social policies, 
the features of programmes geared to improve social 
protection and fight poverty must be borne in mind. It 
is usually held that for reasons of efficiency and equity, 
central governments should be responsible for designing 
and funding such programmes. In practice, however, 
either circumstances or ongoing decentralization are 
making programmes executed by intermediate and local 
governments increasingly widespread. Box III.3 classes 
social protection and anti-poverty programmes on the 
basis of the level of government executing them. 
Classifying these programmes in Latin America 
reveals how difficult it really is to distribute functions 
among jurisdictions on the basis of theory and regulations. 
Table III.3 summarizes the proposed classification, with 
examples from each case. Initiatives to combat poverty 
and improve social protection are being implemented 
across the region by different levels of government. 
Particularly noteworthy is the existence of many central 
government programmes that deal with decentralized 
issues. Even more striking are the local programmes that 
address issues associated with centralized policies. Some 
attempts at comprehensive policies linking initiatives 
at different levels of government were identified, but 
this has not always been the case. In any event, it is 
clear that the enormous diversity of situations in the 
region requires a major effort to coordinate the different 
levels of government at times of increased demand for 
these programmes. 
Table III.3 
LATIN AMERICA: CLASSIFICATION OF PROGRAMMES BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
Programmes Responsibility of central government Responsibility of local government 
Source: O. Cetrángolo, “Búsqueda de cohesión social y sostenibilidad fiscal en los procesos de descentralización”, Políticas sociales series, No. 131 (LC/L.2700-P), Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2007. United Nations publication, Sales No. S.07.II.G.50 S.07.II.G.50. 
Beyond the theoretical grounding of and the specific 
rationale underlying ach national experience with 
decentralization, it is important t  o e that the devolution 
of functions to subnational lev l  of gover ment is subject 
to a set of conditioning factors and limitations of such 
consequence that they have sparked considerable tension 
between decentralization and other policy objectives. 
Particular attention should be paid to conflicts with fiscal 
sustainability andterritorial and social cohesion. 
The decentralization of functions increases the demand
for r source  by sub ational governments so they can 
provide soc al services, and it can trigger fiscal tensio s. In 
addition, increased local autonomy generates pressure in 
wealthier regions to stop contributing to the maintenance 
of public policies in poorer areas, thus jeopardizing social 
and territorial cohesion. So, while there have been many 
attempts to introduce varying degrees of decentralization, 



























 Income transfers: Chile Solidario; Unemployed  Employment and job training: Girasoles 
Heads of Household Plan or PJJHD    Programme (Montevideo); provincial 
(Argentina); development strategy for    employment programmes (Argentina) 
depressed and conflict areas (Colombia) 
Food programmes: Emergency Hunger Programme  Programmes coordinated with other levels of 
(Argentina); Zero Hunger (Brazil); family    government: Local food security, nutritional 
assistance and nutrition programme (Colombia);    analysis and education project, Corral 
supplemental food programme (Peru); school meal    de Bustos municipality (Argentina) 
and child nutrition programme (Guatemala) 
Employment: Getting to Work (Argentina); programme 
to eradicate child labour (Brazil); employment 
and job training programme (Colombia) 
 
Distribution of material for decentralized  Provision of decentralized services: Family Health 
functions: book distribution (Brazil);    Programme (Brazil); mobile health programme (Lima) 
Remediar programme (Argentina) Assistance programs: Summer programme 
Guaranteed minimum spending: Fund for the for street children, and neighbourhood 
Maintenance and Development of Primary Education snack and meal centres (Montevideo) 
and for Teacher Development (FUNDEF) (Brazil)  Urban development: multi-sector investment 
Support for local capacities: fiscal decentralization programmes (Brazil); subsidy for public transit 
and municipal financial management, and tickets and suspension of property taxes owed 
decentralization of public services (Honduras) by lower-income homeowners (Montevideo) 
Programmes coordinated with local programmes: 
Emergency Housing Programme (Argentina) 
Urban development: Urban quality of life 
programme (Colombia); subsidy for drinking 
water and sanitation service bills (Chile); 
Guatemalan Housing Fund (Guatemala) 
 
National strategies: strengthening local  Programa Crecer (Rosario, Argentina); creation 
development (Honduras); Poverty Reduction    of municipal agencies (Lurin, Peru); Committee 
Strategy, or ERP (Nicaragua)    to Fight Poverty (Villa María del Triunfo, Peru) 
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Because the rationale and logic behind the territorial
assignment of functions differ from those that have 
shaped the distribution of taxation authority, the 
countries usually exhibit varying degrees of imbalance 
between receipts and payments.13  They are reflected in 
the gap between resources and spending at the different 
levels of government (vertical imbalance), or in the gap  
between the fiscal capacities of subnational governments 
at the same level (horizontal imbalance), rooted in pro-
ductive disparities at the regional level. These imbalances 
are usually covered by financial transfers (Ahmad and 
Craig, 1997). 
 Given the horizontal imbalance, the more advanced 
the decentralization of functions, the larger the vertical 
imbalance will be. This does not mean that decentraliza-
tion impedes the pursuit of greater social cohesion, only 
that it highlights the need for mechanisms to coordinate 
sectoral policies that provide for compensating needier 
regions. That is the only way to craft decentralization 
policies that maintain social cohesion and are fiscally 
sustainable over the medium term. 
 Also, the more centralized taxation is the greater the 
need for basic transfers to finance activities that are in 
the hands of subnational governments. Since they are so 
dependent on attainment of the social cohesion goals of 
the transfer system in question, it is impossible to evaluate 
decentralization processes and the likelihood of local gov-
ernments being able to carry out their functions without 
considering interjurisdictional financial transfer schemes. 
Indeed, the fiscal impact will be very different depending 
on the modality adopted in each case. 
 There is considerable diversity among transfer 
schemes in the region, depending on the level of govern-
ment, making it very difficult to identify common traits 
that might reveal a pattern. Among the systems in place 
there are (i) unconditional transfers, which give local 
governments greater authority and seek to lessen the dif-
ferences between the financial capacities of the states; the 
magnitude of the transfers depends on central govern-
ment collections and thus is highly procyclical and more 
problematic from a fiscal sustainability point of view; (ii) 
conditional transfers, which are usually present when the 
central government targets a particular policy objective 
and the resources transferred are tailored to central gov-
ernment priorities, usually due to the incomplete decen-
tralization of a certain function; and (iii) transfers with 
a counterparty, which are of particular interest because 
they involve incentives for subnational governments to 
fulfil certain decentralized policy goals defined by the 
central government for the sectoral policy in question.
 In any event, even if the requisite financial resources 
are available, the serious disparities existing at the ter-
ritorial level limit the availability of human resources 
and, in general, of management capacities. This means 
that, in addition to the transfer of monetary resources, 
training and capacity transfers are needed as well. There is 
therefore no denying the need to continue to re-think the 
hierarchical role of central governments in decentralized 
countries, implementing sectoral policies that provide 
for interregional compensation and make it possible to 
guarantee basic social services for the entire population.
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weaknesses of each country and, above all, the financing 
mechanisms accompanying each process (Arredondo, 
Orozco and De Icaza, 2005). 
It is thus important to bear in mind the factors that 
substantially condition attainment of the objectives pursued 
by public decentralization policies. The first factor, 
mentioned in chapter II, has to do with the difficulties that 
the countries of the region face in collecting adequate tax 
revenues. Second, the high and unequal territorial distribution 
of tax bases makes it very difficult to fulfil the fiscal 
co-responsibility  goals that many of the ongoing 
decentralization processes would require. 
While the main source of financing for the public 
sectors is taxes, these are concentrated mainly at central 
government levels. As figure III.7 shows, in the more 
decentralized countries subnational governments 
contribute nearly 20% of total tax revenue. In Brazil, 
states and municipalities collect approximately one third 
of the total, due mainly to revenue from the sales tax on 
merchandise and services (ICMS), which is in the purview 
of the states and the federal district. In more centralized 
countries such as Chile, Costa Rica and Ecuador, on the 
other hand, subnational governments collect less than 
6% of the total. Although Mexico is a federal country, 
tax collection is centralized at the federal government 
level; states and municipalities account for just 6% of 
tax collections.11 
Total subnational government tax revenues have 
grown substantially over the past 10 years. However, this 
is due essentially to the growing importance of transfers 
from central governments, not to an increase in their 
own fiscal resources. As figure III.8 shows, transfers as 
a percentage of subnational government revenue rose 
substantially between 1997 and 2008 while their own tax 
revenues just went from 2.1% of GDP to 2.6% of GDP 
during the same period. 
A country-by-country analysis of the revenue structure 
at these levels of government shows that transfers are 
substantial in most of them. In Argentina, Mexico and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, they exceed seven 
percentage points of GDP; in Colombia and Ecuador they 
are in the area of 4% of GDP. In Ecuador and Mexico, 
transfers received by intermediate and local levels of 
government are the main source of funding, at 70% of 
total revenue. 
Factors ranging from the high degree of productive 
disparity in the region to weak subnational tax collection 
agencies are behind the slow growth of subnational revenues 
and the high degree of dependence on intergovernmental 
transfers (Cetrángolo and J.P. Jiménez, 2009). As stated 
earlier, tax collections by subnational governments have 
stagnated over the past 11 years and the gaps in subnational 
tax pressure among the countries of Latin America have 
remained constant.12 The poor evolution of subnational 
tax collections in the countries of the region is related to 
the inadequate level and structure of subnational taxes, 
which are, in turn, related to the available tax base. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA: TAX COLLECTION STRUCTURE BY LEVEL 
OF GOVERNMENT, 2008 
(Percentages of total collections and of GDP) 








Argentina      Bolivia Brazil Chile      Colombia      Costa Ecuador      Mexico 
(Plur. State of) Rica 
Central Subnational 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information. 
Figure 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE STRUCTURE OF SUBNATIONAL 
REVENUES, 1997-2008 
(Percentages of GDP) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information. 
11 For more details, see J.P. Jiménez and Podestá (2009). 12 The only countries in which the subnational tax burden has increased
are Brazil and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. In Brazil, however,
as highlighted by Afonso (2004), the sales tax on merchandise and
services has increased less than indirect federal taxes have, because










































































   
8.5 
 














                
  
           
           







To improve distributive impacts and promote equality and 
social cohesion in Latin America and the Caribbean, effec-
tive public policies will be required in a variety of key areas. 
First, public policy needs to achieve the greatest possible results 
in terms of economic growth and employment, since without 
steady, sustained growth in the economy the demand for social 
assistance proliferates while the resources needed to finance the 
necessary State actions are hard to obtain. Second, moderniza-
tion of social policies is vital, and this includes both education 
and vocational training policies designed to increase people’s 
capabilities and policies constituting a rights-based social 
protection paradigm. Furthermore, these can have a positive 
feedback effect on economic growth.
There is conclusive empirical evidence for the impact 
that macroeconomic crises and high levels of volatility 
have on the relative situation of the poorest sectors of the 
population. It is they who bear the brunt when incomes 
fall, and they lack the resources to cushion the negative 
effects of macroeconomic shocks, characterized as these 
are by falling incomes, job losses and reduced social 
benefits.
 Recognizing that stability is a necessary condition 
for stronger growth and better distribution means setting 
out from broadly defined macroeconomic policy goals 
that are not confined to inflation control but encompass 
the need to reduce real-term volatility through meas-
ures, policies and institutions capable of smoothing the 
fluctuations caused by external and internal shocks and 
those originating in macro policy and its impacts.
 In a region characterized by a highly heterogeneous 
production structure, reflected in the labour market by 
large productivity and earnings divides, the rate and 
characteristics of growth have a strong influence on 
income distribution and on the kind of access different 
social groups have to the goods and services produced 
in the economy. From this perspective, the way differ-
ent groups participate in markets (the labour market, for 
instance) entails significant differences in the extent to 
which policies affect them. Again, aggregate volatility 
generates greater fluctuations in the incomes of poorer 
households, especially when, as in our region, unemploy-
ment is higher in the poorer strata and this lack of job 
opportunities drives people into informality. As ECLAC 
has often argued, crises have consequences in terms of 
employment, poverty and inequity which are not quickly 
reversed during upturns and whose effects on inequality 
are lasting and may even become permanent if the educa-
tional careers of young people from poor families are cut 
short. 
 The decline in the social assistance capacity of the 
State during periods of recession in the region, owing to 
the procyclical character of public social spending, adds 
a further element of volatility to the consumption of the 
poor, exposing them to an additional policy risk. This 
highlights the need for greater policy space so that, in the 
particular case in hand, instruments are in place to pro-
tect the neediest at the time when this is generally most 
necessary, in the downturns of the economic cycle.
 One of the keys to creating this policy space is the 
development of countercyclical fiscal capacities or fiscal 
positions that are sustainable over time so that pro-
grammes to counteract the social effects of recessions, 
such as unemployment and increased poverty, can be 
strengthened as required. This does not just mean trying 
to balance public spending and revenue, however. An 
increasingly important development has been the demand 
for public action that is more efficient and transparent, 
while at the same time offering scope for greater citizen 
involvement. This would contribute to the legitimacy of 
public policies and of the taxes needed to sustain them 
over time, while making it possible to break the vicious 
circle whereby States are unable to collect taxes in part 
because their activities do not enjoy the necessary legiti-
macy among citizens, whether because of shortcomings 
and gaps in their mode of action or because of a lack of 
financing.
 The region’s fiscal systems share three common char-
acteristics: (i) low tax pressure, (ii) regressive taxation and 
(iii) poorly directed public spending. On the revenue side, 
the level of taxation, tax structures and large-scale fraud 
and tax avoidance all have major effects on equity. For 
one thing, citizens’ social needs are impossible to meet 
without financial resources. For another, evasion poses a 
serious problem of equity in that the failure to meet tax 
obligations results in other taxpayers having to pay more 
and/or in public goods and services being forfeited.
 While there has been some progress in these areas 
in recent years, the situation is still generally character-
ized by tax structures that rely heavily on consumption 
taxes, by high levels of evasion and avoidance and low 
yields from direct taxes such as income tax, especially the 
portion payable by natural persons (particularly when 
compared with levels in developed countries), and by low 
or non- existent property taxes.
 There are two basic reasons for the low relative level 
of direct taxation in the region, namely narrow tax bases 
and high levels of non-payment. The end result is taxation 
rates that are too low to achieve economic effects of any 
considerable scale. Both of these phenomena are also a 
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consequence of the tax breaks and loopholes character-
istic of the region’s taxation systems. Not only does this 
situation fail to meet the basic requirements of equity, 
i.e., that people with the same payment capacity should 
pay the same amount of tax (horizontal equity) and 
that people with a greater payment capacity should pay 
proportionally more (vertical equity), but it gives rise to 
economic distortions in resource allocation that impair 
the overall efficiency of the economy.
 As noted earlier, public spending that was oriented 
towards the creation of more cohesive societies would 
make a huge contribution to the legitimacy of the State 
and people’s willingness to finance its activities by paying 
tax. Where social policy is concerned it must be realized 
that, contrary to the claims made until a few years ago, 
the labour market is not enough by itself to guarantee 
social integration. Consequently, as analysed in earlier 
documents (ECLAC, 2006 and 2010b), social protec-
tion cannot rely exclusively on the capacity of contribu-
tory systems associated with employment, which means 
there is a need to give fresh thought and importance to 
solidarity mechanisms. Better distribution is not just the 
outcome of higher public social spending but also de-
pends on the ability to incorporate and improve solidar-
ity transfer mechanisms as part of the benefits provided. 
This in no way invalidates the importance of strategies 
to formalize employment relationships by extending 
labour institutions, with all the rights and duties entailed 
for both workers and employers. Other labour market 
policies to address aspects of inequality in this area are 
unemployment insurance, training mechanisms (espe-
cially for workers with an intermediate or low education 
level) and income policies.
 Where health systems are concerned, priority must 
be given to the process of universalizing basic benefits by 
making the system more equitable, combining contribu-
tory and non-contributory financing and bringing in 
solidarity transfer schemes and/or risk compensation 
mechanisms to minimize the barriers to health service 
access for the less well-off. A number of preliminary tasks 
need to be performed before this goal can be reached, 
however, such as coordinating public subsystems, social 
security and the private sector while at the same time 
consolidating the two types of financing (contributory 
and non-contributory).
 Regarding education, there is general agreement as
to its contribution to more inclusive development and 
as to the significant increase in coverage achieved in the 
region’s countries. There is still a great deal of work to be 
done, however, when it comes to expanding coverage in 
areas such as preschool education, evening out the qual-
ity of the education provided by reducing segmentation 
in education systems, and improving the generation of 
capabilities that can bring about greater equality in our 
societies while at the same time enhancing the ability of 
our economies to compete in a globalized world.
 Analysis of public-sector education and health service 
provision needs to be taken down to the territorial level, 
particularly in view of the region’s characteristics. Over 
the past 25 years, the region has seen a far-reaching 
process of decentralization of powers and functions to 
subnational governments. This process, encompassing al-
most all the Latin American countries, has varied greatly 
in characteristics and scope. Apart from the avowed goals 
of each reform, they have all had significant effects on 
macroeconomic performance, income distribution and 
the public accounts. Different circumstances have often 
given rise to severe strains between these policy objec-
tives. These strains have manifested themselves differently 
in each case, and have usually had a significant impact 
on the relations between different levels of government in 
each country.
 The advantages of having different levels of govern-
ment are connected with the benefits of centralizing 
decision- making for matters requiring national policies 
and allowing public choices to be  made  locally when 
this is more advantageous. The situation can vary greatly 
depending on the public good or service being decentral-
ized. Decisions about the organization of decentralized 
public services are taken in diffuse and complex ways, 
as they do not depend on the decision to decentralize as 
such but on a whole array of circumstances and decisions 
among which determinations relating to sectoral and ter-
ritorial policies are to the fore.
 The expected benefits of decentralization need to 
be evaluated in the light of the conditions under which 
reform is being implemented, and it is indispensable here 
to recognize a number of peculiarities characterizing 
Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the high level 
of distributive inequality, the territorial inequality result-
ing from highly unbalanced development and the public 
policy constraints imposed by low levels of tax pressure. 
Throughout the region, these characteristics affect the ca-
pacity of governments to raise the desired amounts of tax 
revenue locally and make it harder to achieve the goals 
pursued by public-sector decentralization policies.
 Once the impossibility of achieving full decentrali-
zation with financially autonomous local governments 
has been accepted, consideration must be given to the 
need for large-scale intergovernmental financial transfers 
to deal with the vertical and horizontal imbalances of 
subnational governments and facilitate the attainment of 
social cohesion goals. To achieve this objective, it is neces-
sary to reassess the role of central governments, giving 
greater importance to the task of balancing out differ-
ences between regions and coordinating public policies 
that have a common core, even if they are decentralized 
to different degrees.
 To synthesize, the region’s countries are faced with 
a common challenge that entails the necessity of “mov-
ing towards greater equality in access, especially in fields 
such as education, health, employment, housing, basic 
services, environmental quality and social security” 
(ECLAC, 2010b, p. 11). The reforms needed to close 
the social divides that characterize the region require a 
high degree of consensus and political will, as well as the 
institutional and administrative capacity to oversee the 
quality of social spending.
 In summary, public policies must secure the financ-
ing needed to improve citizen access to social provision in 
a way that combines efficiency with solidarity, relevance 
and universality, all at the most appropriate level of 
government. This should be the basis for the new fiscal 
covenant that is needed. Achieving it will require an 
unremitting effort to build increasing consensus on each 
of the aspects involved, at a time of rising demands for 
transparency in the use of resources and higher standards 
of accountability. Public policies commensurate with the 
challenges facing the region require a constant effort to 
learn and rethink the kinds of intervention needed to 
overcome poverty and inequality and to increase people’s 
sense of belonging to a growing economy.
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Table A-1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
Annual growth rates 
Gross domestic product b 
Per capita gross domestic product b 





























Urban open unemployment d 
Total gross external debt/GDP e 
Total gross external debt/ 



















181 177 169 138 102 84 83 73 100 
Millions of dollars 
Balance of payments f 
Current account balance 
Merchandise trade balance 
Exports of goods f.o.b. 
Imports of goods  f.o.b. 
Services trade balance 
Income balance 




























































-97 859 -108 036
67 072 66 978 
Capital and financial balance g 
Net foreign direct investment 




















































-48 734 -127 281
110 147 252 634 
Net transfer of resources



















Percentages of GDP 







Central-government public debt 









































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Based on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars. 
c       December - December variation.  
d     The data for Argentina and Brazil have been adjusted to allow for changes in methodology in 2003 and 2002, respectively. 
e     Estimates based on figures denominated in dollars at current prices. Does not include Cuba. 
f         Does not include Cuba.  
g     Includes errors and omissions. 
h     A minus sign (-) indicates an increase in reserve assets. 
i         Central government, except for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, where coverage corresponds to general government. Simple averages. Includes information from 19
Latin American and Caribbean countries: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
 El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 
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Table A-2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Millions of current dollars) 
Latin America and the Caribbean 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 



































































































































































882 044  1 089 397  1 366 853  1 638 636  1 574 



























































































949 330  1 022 830  1 086 




































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Based in the new quarterly national accounts figures published by the country, base year 2005. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 
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Table A-3 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 



















































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Based on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars. 
c       Based in the new quarterly national accounts figures published by the country, base year 2005.  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 
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Table A-4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates) 
2009 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 



















































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Based on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars. 
c       Based in the new quarterly national accounts figures published by the country, base year 2005.  
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Table A-5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPONENTS OF TOTAL DEMAND a 
(Indices 2000=100) 
2009 b 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total supply 
Gross domestic product 
Imports of goods and services 
Total demand 
Total consumption Private 
consumption Government 
consumption Gross capital 
formation Gross fixed capital 
formation Domestic demand 




































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Based on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars. Includes information on 20 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational
State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
b     Preliminary figures.  
Table A-6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR a  
(Indices 2000=100) 
2009 b 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Gross domestic product at market prices 
Agriculture, livestock, forestry, hunting and fishing 
Mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Electricity, gas, water and sanitation services 
Transport, storage and communications 
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels 
Financial establishments, insurance, real estate 
and business services 



























































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Based  on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars. Includes information on 33 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Surinam, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay. 
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Table A-7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION a 
(Percentages of GDP) 





















Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 

























































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     On the basis of figures expressed in constant 2000 dollars. 
b     Preliminary figures. 
Table A-8 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT a 
(Percentages of GDP) 
2009 b 2009 b 2009 b 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Argentina 















































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Based on values calculated in national currency and expressed in current dollars. 
b     Preliminary figures. 
Gross domestic investment National saving External saving 
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Table A-9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Millions of dollars) 
Exports of goods f.o.b. Exports of services Imports of goods f.o.b. Imports of services 
2009 c 2009 c 2009 c 2009 c 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean d 
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Table A-9 (continued) 
Trade balance Income balance Current transfers balance Current account balance 
2009 c 2009 c 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean d 39 398 4 034 19 515 -96 896 -106 834 -98 124 67 011 66 932 60 440 9 506 -35 868 -18 171 
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Table A-9 (concluded) 
Capital and 
finantial balance a 
Reserve assets 
(variation) b Overall balance Other financing 
2009 c 2009 c 2009 c 2009 c 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean d 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Includes errors and omissions. 
b     A minus sign (-) indicates an increase in reserve assets. 
c       Preliminary figures.  
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Table A-10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF GOODS, f.o.b. 
(Indices 2000=100) 
Value Volume Unit value 
2009 a 2009 a 2009 a 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 
Argentina 
















































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Does not include Cuba. 
Table A-11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS OF GOODS, f.o.b. 
(Indices 2000=100) 
Value Volume Unit value 
2009 a 2009 a 2009 a 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 
Argentina 
















































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
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Table A-12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE FOR GOODS f.o.b. / f.o.b. 
(Indices 2000=100) 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 
Argentina 
















































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Does not include Cuba. 
Table A-13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET RESOURCE TRANSFER a 
(Millions of dollars) 
Latin America and the Caribbean c 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 



















































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     The net resource transfer is calculated as total net capital income minus the income balance (net payments of profits and interest). Total net capital income is the balance on
the capital and financial accounts plus errors and omissions, plus loans and the use of IMF credit plus exceptional financing. Negative figures indicate resources transferred
outside the country. 
b     Preliminary figures. 
c       Does not include Cuba.  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 b 
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Table A-14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT a 
(Millions of dollars) 
Latin America and the Caribbean
























Dominican  Republic 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 










































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Corresponds to direct investment in the reporting economy after deduction of outward direct investment by residents of that country. Includes reinvestment of profits. 
b     Preliminary figures. 
Table A-15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL BOND ISSUES a 
(Millions of dollars) 
2005 b 2006 c 2007 d 2008 e 2009 f 2001 2002 2003 2004 2010 
I g II 




















Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 






























































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Merrill-Lynch and J.P. Morgan 
and Latin Finance. 
a     Includes sovereign, bank and corporate bonds. 
b     Does not include US$ 584 million issued by the Andean Development Corporation (ADC) and US$ 200 million issued by the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (CABEI). 
c       Does not include US$ 250 million issued by the Andean Development Corporation (ADC), US$ 250 million issued by the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) and US$ 567 
million issued by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). 
d     Does not include US$ 539 million issued by the Andean Development Corporation (ADC). 
e     Does not include US$ 447 million issued by the Andean Development Corporation (ADC). 
f         Does not include US$ 1 billiion issued by the Andean Development Corporation (ADC), US$ 500 million issued by the Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
(CABEI) and US$ 1,300 million issued by the NII Holdings. 
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Table A-16 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT a 
(Millions of dollars) 
2009 b 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean c 
 











Cuba d e 
Dominica d 
Ecuador 












Dominican Republic d 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia d 
Suriname d 























































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund. 
b     Preliminary figures. 
c       Does not include Cuba.  
d     Refers to external public debt. 
e     From 2004 on refers only to active external debt; excludes other external debt, 60.2% of which is official debt owed to the Paris Club. 
f         Up to 2002 corresponds to public external debt.  
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Table A-17 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
(Millions of dollars) 
2010 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
II a I 
Latin America and the Caribbean 163 177 164 784  197 615 225 668 262 168 319 045 459 152 512 240 566 961 560 358 563 270 

























Saint Kitts and Nevis b 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines b 
Saint Lucia b 
Suriname f 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 


















































































































































































































































































































































2 203 c 
2 527 
103 861 c 
1 553 
... 
3 885 c 
35 382 








Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Balance as of June. 
b     Net international reserves. 
c       Balance as of May.  
d     Freely available International reserves. 
e     Balance as of April. 
f         Does not include gold.  
g     Balance as of February. 
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Table A-18 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STOCK EXCHANGE INDICES 
(National indices to end of period, 31 December 2000=100) 
2010 











Trinidad and Tobago 


























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Bloomberg. 
Table A-19 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OVERALL REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES a 
(Indices 2000=100, deflacted by CPI) 
2009 b 2010 b c 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean d 
Argentina 
Barbados 

















Dominican Republic f 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 

















































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources. 
a     Annual averages. A country’s overall real effective exchange rate index is calculated by weighting its real bilateral exchange rate indices with each of its trading partners by
each partner’s share in the country’s total trade flows in terms of exports and imports. The extraregional real effective exchange rate index excludes trade with other 
Latin American and Caribbean countries. A currency depreciates in real effective terms when this index rises and appreciates when it falls. 
b     Preliminary figures, weighted by trade in 2008. 
c       January-May average.  
d     Simple average of the extraregional real effective exchange rate for 20 countries. It excludes Barbados and Dominica. 
e     Preliminary figures. Yearly calculation by ECLAC, based on consumer price data and nominal exchange rates provided by the National Statistical Office of Cuba. 
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Table A-20 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PARTICIPATION RATE 
(Average annual rates) 
2009 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Brazil c Six metropolitan areas
Chile National total 
Colombia Thirteen metropolitan 
areas 
Costa Rica National total 
Cuba d National total 
Ecuador Urban total 
El Salvador e National total 
Honduras National total 
Jamaica f National total 
Mexico Urban areas 
Nicaragua National total 
Panama National total 
Paraguay National total 
Peru Metropolitan Lima 
Dominican Republic National total 




Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     The data relating to the different countries are not comparable owing to differences in coverage and in the definition of the working age population. The regional series are 
simple averages of national data (excluding Nicaragua and the Plurinational State of Bolivia) and include adjustments for lack of information and changes in methodology. 
c       New measurements have been used since 2003; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
d     In Cuba, the working-age population is measured as follows: for males, 17 to 59 years and for females, 15 to 54 years. 
e     New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
f         New measurements have been used since 2002; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
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Table A-21 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OPEN URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
(Average annual rates) 












El Salvador g 
Guatemala 
Honduras 






Dominican Republic d 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago d 
Uruguay 
















































































































































































































































Six metropolitan areas 
National total 
Thirteen metropolitan areas 
Urban total 
National total 















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     The data for Argentina and Brazil have been adjusted to reflect changes in methodology in 2003 and 2002, respectively. 
c       New measurements have been used since 2003; the data are not comparable with the previous series.  
d     Includes hidden unemployment. 
e     New measurements have been used since 2002; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
f         Up to 2003, the figures refer to Cuenca, Guayaquil and Quito.  
g     New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
Table A-22 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMPLOYMENT RATE a 
(Average annual rates) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 b 
Latin America and the Caribbean c 
Argentina d 
Barbados 
















Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 










































































































































































































Six metropolitan areas 
National total 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Employed population as a percentage of the working-age population.
 b Preliminary figures. 
c       Weighted average adjusted for lack of information and changes in methodology.
 d     New measurements have been used since 2003; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
e     New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the 
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Table A-23 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FORMAL EMPLOYMENT INDICATORS 
(Indices 2000=100) 




Costa Rica d 




















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Dependent workers paying into pension schemes. 
c       Workers covered by social and labour legislation.  
d     Workers with social security coverage. 
e     Workers of medium-sized and large firms. 
f         Private-sector workers with social security coverage. From 2008 on, refers to workers in small, medium-sized and large businesses in manufacturing, commerce and 
services. 
g     Employement positions generating social security contributions. 
Table A-24 
LATIN AMERICA: VISIBLE UNDEREMPLOYMENT BY HOURS 
(Percentages of employed workers) 





Costa Rica f 
Ecuador g 




























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Employed persons who work less than 35 hours per week and wish to work more hours; total urban areas. 
c       Employed persons who work less than 40 hours per week and wish to work more hours; six metropolitan areas.  
d     Employed persons who work less than 35 hours per week and who wish to work more; national total; third quarter of each year. The figures up to 2005 and since 2006 are 
not directly comparable since the sample changed. 
e     Employed persons who work less than 48 hours per week and wish to work more hours; 13 metropolitan areas. 
f         Employed persons who work less than 47 hours per week and wish to work more hours; national total.  
g     Employed persons who work less than 40 hours per week and wish to work more hours. Up to 2006, Cuenca, Guayaquil and Quito; since 2007, urban national. 
h     Employed persons who work less than 40 hours per week and wish to work more hours; total urban areas. New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are 
not comparable with the previous series. 
i         Employed persons who work less than 36 hours per week and wish to work more hours; total urban areas.  
j         Employed workers wishing to work more than their current job permits, national total.  
k       Employed persons who work less than 40 hours per week and wish to work more hours; total urban areas.  
l         Employed persons who work less than 30 hours per week and wish to work more hours; total urban areas.  
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Table A-25 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL AVERAGE WAGES 
(Average annual Index, 2000=100) 
2009 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina b 




Costa Rica f 
Cuba 

























































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Manufacturing. From 2005, registered private-sector workers. 
c       Private-sector average wage index.  
d     Workers covered by social and labour legislation. Since 2003, private sector only. 
e     General index of hourly wages. 
f         Average wages declared by workers covered by social securit y. 
g     Gross salary. 
h     Average wages declared by workers covered by social security. From 2008 on, refers to workers in small, medium-sized and large businesses in manufacturing, commerce 
and services. 
i         Private sector workers in the Lima metropolitan area. 
j         Estimate based on data for June. 
Table A-26 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REAL MINIMUM WAGE 
(Indices 2000=100) 
2009 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Argentina 







































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
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Table A-27 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MONETARY BASE 
(End-of-year balances as percentages of GDP) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 










































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
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Table A-28 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MONEY SUPPLY (M3) a 
(End-of-year balances as percentages of GDP) 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 










































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     According to the ECLAC definition, this corresponds to M1 plus savings and time deposits in national currency plus foreign currency deposits. 
b     According to the country’s definition, this corresponds to M1 plus special interest-bearing deposits, savings deposits and securities issued by deposit institutions. 
c       According to the country’s definition, this also includes deposits of entitites in liquidation and term deposit certificates of special entities and demand deposits of non-bank 
entities. 
d     Refers to M2 (M1 plus fixed-term deposits). 
e     Does not include foreign-currency deposits. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
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Table A-29 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS 
(End-of-year balances as percentages of GDP) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

















Dominican Republic b 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 


























































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Term deposits in foreign currency. 
b     Series corresponding to harmonized monetary indicators. 
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Table A-30 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DOMESTIC CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
(End-of-year balances as percentages of GDP) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 










































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Includes credit, services and agricultural production cooperative production units, private farmers and individuals.
c       Credit granted to the private sector by the banking sector. 
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Table A-31 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REPRESENTATIVE LENDING RATES 
(Annual average of annualized monthly rates) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 

























Dominican Republic d 
Saint Kitts and Nevis a 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines a 
Saint Lucia a 
Suriname o 
Trinidad and Tobago d 
Uruguay u 










































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Weighted average lending rates. 
b     Local-currency loans at fixed or renegotiable rates, signature loans of up to 89 days. 
c       Interest rate on loans and overdrafts, weighted average.  
d     Prime lending rate. 
e     Rate for personal and business loans, residential and other construction; weighted average. 
f         Nominal dollar rate for 60-91-day banking operations . 
g     Preset lending rate for legal persons. 
h     Lending rate for 90-360-day periods, non-adjustable operations. 
i         Total lending rate of the system (weighted average of all lending rates).  
j         Average lending rate in the financial system.  
k       Corporate lending rate in convertible pesos.  
l         Benchmark dollar lending rate.  
m   Basic lending rate for up to 1 year. 
n     Average of minimum and maximum lending rates. 
o     Average lending rate. 
p     Lending rate published by the International Monetary Fund. 
q     Weighted average of the weekly lending rate for loans in national currency in the system. 
r       Interest rate on 1-year trade credit.  
s       Weighted average of effective lending rates in national currency, not including overdrafts or credit cards.  
t         Average lending rate, constant structure.  
u     Business credit, 30-367 days. 
v       Average rate for loan operations for the six major commercial banks.  
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Table A-32 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES 
(Percentage variation December – December) 
2010 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 


























Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 





















































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Twelve-month variation to May 2010. 
b     The only English-speaking Caribbean countries included are Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
c       Twelve-month variation to March 2010.  
d     Twelve-month variation to February 2010. 
e     Refers to national-currency markets. 
f         Twelve-month variation to April 2010.  
Table A-33 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: WHOLESALE PRICES 
(Percentage variation December – December) 





































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Twelve-month variation to May 2010. 
b   Twelve-month variation to April 2010. 
Abbreviations: 
WPI: Wholesale price index; IPA-Media: Wholesale price index (acronym in Portuguese); PPI: Producer price index; IND-PPI: Industrial producer price index; NPPI: National producer 
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Table A-34 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC-SECTOR BALANCE 
(Percentages of GDP) 
Central government Non-financial public sector 
Primary balance Overall balance Primary balance Overall balance 
2009 a 2009 a 2009 a 2009 a 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries) b
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries) c 
Caribbean (13 countries) d 
 

























Dominican Republic k 
Saint Kitts and Nevis l 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries. 
c       Simple averages. Includes information on 19 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
d     Simple averages. Includes information on 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. The simple average for the central government includes the primary balance
 and
 
the overall balance of the non-financial public sector of Barbados. 
e     The central government coverage corresponds to national public administration. 
f         The central government coverage corresponds to general government.  
g     The figures are derived from the primary balance based on the below-the-line criterion and nominal interest. 
h     The central government coverage corresponds to the central national government. The central government balance does not include the cost of financial restructuring. 
i         The central government coverage corresponds to the central administration.  
j         The central government coverage corresponds to the federal government. The coverage of the non-financial public sector refers to the public sector.  
k       The overall balance includes the residue.  
l         The central government coverage corresponds to the federal government. 
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Table A-35 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL REVENUE 
(Percentages of GDP) 
Total revenue Current revenue Capital revenue 
2009 a 2009 a 2009 a 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries) b 
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries) c 
Caribbean (13 countries) d 
 




























Saint Kitts and Nevis i 





Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay
 














































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries. 
c       Simple averages. Includes information on 19 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
d     Simple averages. Includes information on 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
 
e     Non-financial public sector. 
f         General government.  
g     Total revenue corresponds to revenue plus sales of physical assets. 
h     Total revenue includes special funds and incorporates accrued revenues. 
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Table A-36 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL EXPENDITURE 
(Percentages of GDP) 
Total expenditure Current expenditure Capital expenditure Interest 
2009 a 2009 a 2007   2008  2009 a 2009 a 2007 2008 2007 2008 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries) b
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries) c 










































Bolivia (Plurinational State of) f 
Brazil



















Saint Kitts and Nevis j 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Saint Lucia 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Uruguay 













































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries. 
c       Simple averages. Includes information on 19 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
d     Simple averages. Includes information on 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
 e     Non-financial public sector. 
f         General government.  
g     Total expenditure refers to expenditure plus investment, capital transfers and fixed capital consumption. 
h     Includes accrued expenditure and floating debt. 
i         Current expenditure, capital expenditure and interest correspond to federal government expenditure.  
j         Federal government.  
k       Total expenditure includes extrabudgetary. 
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Table A-37 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX BURDEN 
INCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS 
(Percentages of GDP) 
2009 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries) b
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries) c 






















































Saint Kitts and Nevis e 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines e 
Saint Lucia e 
Suriname e 
Trinidad and Tobago e  g 
Uruguay 










































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries. 
c       Simple averages. Includes information on 19 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
d     Simple averages. Includes information on 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
 e     Does not include social security contributions. 
f         General government. 
g     Refers to non-petroleum sector. 
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Table A-38 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX BURDEN AND COMPOSITION OF TAX REVENUES 




Income tax and 
capital gains tax 
Other direct 
taxes Total Direct taxes Property tax 
2008 2009 a 2008 2009 a 2008 2009 a 2008 2009 a 2008 2009 a 2008 2009 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries) b
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries) c 
Caribbean (13 countries) d 
20.5  20.5 
17.8  17.7 

























































Saint Kitts and Nevis e 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines e 
Saint Lucia e 
Suriname e 
Trinidad and Tobago e  g 
Uruguay 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
21.3  19.3 
30.7  31.6 
17.3  15.3 
32.9  32.3 
22.7  21.7 
21.7  22.6 
34.4  34.3 
19.9  16.1 
15.5  15.0 
15.6  13.8 
23.3  21.2 
30.4  31.6 
16.0  17.9 
14.6  14.0 
23.7  22.9 
11.5  10.7 
20.2  21.6 
10.6  11.7 
16.3  15.7 
24.2  26.7 
9.8  11.2 
22.1  22.2 
16.5  17.0 
13.0  14.5 
17.2  15.2 
15.0  13.1 
27.0  26.6 
28.6  27.1 
27.2  28.1 
25.7  30.6 
14.3  14.1 
24.2  25.1 















































































































































































































































































13.9  15.7 
7.6    7.8 
5.2    7.4 
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Specific goods Tax on trade Other indirect 




2008 2009 a 2008 2009 a 2008 2009 a 2009 a 2009 a 2008 2008 2009 
Latin America and the Caribbean (33 countries) b
Latin America and the Caribbean (19 countries) c 
Caribbean (13 countries) d 
12.3  11.8 
9.5    9.1 

























































Saint Kitts and Nevis e 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines e 
Saint Lucia e 
Suriname e 
Trinidad and Tobago e  g 
Uruguay 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
17.4  15.5 
16.7  16.3 
12.4  10.9 
19.1  16.6 
15.1  13.9 
14.2  12.5 
15.1  14.5 






























































































































































































































































































13.9  13.1 
24.2  25.2 
7.5    8.9 
8.1    7.4 
17.1  16.5 
7.9    7.1 
11.7  13.0 
6.9    7.5 
9.9    9.7 
13.6  15.8 
2.7    4.2 
12.2  11.4 
12.6  11.9 







































18.2  16.7 
21.4  19.9 
18.7  19.2 
12.5  14.5 
6.2    6.2 
11.4  11.2 
6.7    7.9 











Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Simple averages of the figures for 33 countries. 
c       Simple averages. Includes information on 19 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. 
d       Simple average. Includes information on 13 Caribbean countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
 e     Does not include social security contributions. 
f         General government.  
g     Refers to non-petroleum sector. 
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Table A-39 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GROSS PUBLIC DEBT 
(Percentages of GDP) 
2009 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 
Argentina c 






































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Simple averages. 
c       National public administration. As from 2005, does not include debt not presented for swap.  
d     Does not include publicly guaranteed private debt. 
e     Net public debt. Federal government and central bank. 
f         Consolidated.  
g     Central national government. 
h     Does not include public sector commitments to commercial banks. 
i         Federal government.  
j         Does not include domestic floating debt.  
k       Non-financial public sector.  
Table A-40 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NON-FINANCIAL PUBLIC-SECTOR GROSS PUBLIC DEBT 
(Percentages of GDP) 
2009 a 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Latin America and the Caribbean b 
Argentina c 















Dominican Republic k 
Uruguay 





















































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     Simple averages. 
c       Up to 2002 the figures refer to national public-sector debt plus provincial debt. From  2003 on, the figures are consolidated. 
d     Refers to the external debt of the non-financial public-sector and central-government domestic debt. 
e     Net public debt. Public sector. 
f         Consolidated.  
g     Consolidated non-financial public sector. 
h     Does not include public sector commitments to commercial banks. 
i         Includes public sector external debt and federal government domestic debt.  
j         Includes local and regional government debt owed to Banco de la Nación.  
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Table A-41 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL INDICATORS 
(Percentages of GDP) 































































































Ingreso total Gasto 
total Resultado 
primario b Resultado 












































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a     Preliminary figures. 
b     The primary and overall balances do not include financial resources (credit operations and disposal of assets).
 c       Includes states and municipalities.  
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